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ABSTRACT 
Several high-profile data breaches that compromised consumer 
payment cards information have generated high levels of public 
concern as well as regulatory attention and extensive litigation. In 
response to growing concerns about payment fraud, payment card 
networks in the United States have moved toward the rapid 
replacement of traditional magnetic-stripe payment card technology 
to new EMV (Europay, Mastercard, and Visa) computer chip-based 
technology. At the same time, technological developments in 
contactless payments, such as ApplePay, and new methods of 
cardholder verification, such as biometrics and Big Data 
triangulation, point to the growing obsolescence of legacy payments 
security techniques. This technology creates a unique encrypted 
identifier for each transaction, thereby making it more difficult for 
thieves to steal card numbers and create counterfeit cards. Notably, 
however, U.S. card issuers and networks have chosen not to adopt the 
personal identification number (PIN) method of customer verification 
that has been standard in the United Kingdom and much of Europe 
for the past decade or so but instead have chosen signature 
verification as the preferred method. Many large retail chains and 
retail trade associations have nevertheless lobbied for regulatory or 
statutory action to impose a PIN-verification requirement in addition 
to the inclusion of EMV chips. This Article conducts an economic 
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analysis of the regulation of consumer payment cards and payment 
card fraud. We examine the marginal benefits from heightened levels 
of payment card security as well as the marginal costs. We examine 
the dynamic evolution of payment card anti-fraud technology over 
time and suggest that there is little evidence of market failure in the 
provision of payment security by card networks and issuers and little 
reason to believe that mandating one exclusive, decades-old, static 
verification technology (namely, chip and PIN) would be likely to 
improve overall consumer welfare and economic efficiency today. We 
conclude that rather than blindly adopting the particular verification 
technology that Europe put into place many years ago, U.S. regulators 
should be alert to the evolving and contemporary nature of consumer 
payments and the fluid nature of threats to data privacy and thus 
should not freeze or hamper the adaptability of the payment system. 
We also offer an alternative explanation for the debate over the lack 
of a PIN requirement in the U.S. rooted in Dodd–Frank’s regulation 
of interchange fees. In this manner, the debate over PIN verification 
is just the latest front in the ongoing war between the payment card 
networks and merchants over interchange fees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2015, consumers began to encounter something new 
when they checked out at their local Starbucks. Rather than swiping 
their cards in a familiar motion, they were asked to perform something 
subtler: dip and wait. Although this new motion runs counter to years 
of muscle memory, it’s for our own good. With multi-million dollar 
breaches occurring at an alarmingly increasing frequency, the 
payment card networks (e.g., VISA, MasterCard, American Express) 
and the banks that issues these payment cards (e.g., Citbank, Capital 
One, Bank of America) decided it was time to move the U.S. to the 
Europay-Mastercard-Visa (EMV) standard.1 By October 2015, card 
issuers were expected to replace their legacy magnetic stripe cards 
with new “chip” cards that contain a tiny microprocessor, which 
makes it harder for data thieves to steal credit card information.2 On 
the same schedule, merchants were expected to have terminals that 
read the new chip cards or face liability for fraudulent transaction—a 
change in the status quo, which places liability, in most cases, on the 
issuing bank.3  
The EMV standard was first employed in Europe in the 1990s 
and, in addition to adopting the chip card, required consumers to enter 
a Personal Identification Number (PIN) for most payment card 
transactions.4 Indeed, for this reason, “Chip & PIN” has become the 
                                                   
 1. See The Fundamentals of EMV in the US, GEMALTO, 
https://www.gemalto.com/emv/contactless-us/emv-fundamentals 
[https://perma.cc/WVU3-6URT] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 2. See EMV MIGRATION FORUM, UNDERSTANDING THE 2015 U.S. FRAUD 
LIABILITY SHIFTS 1, https://www.merchantlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ 
EMF-Liability-Shift-Document-FINAL5-052715.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FQJ-
FFCN]. 
 3. See Sienna Kossman, 7 Merchant Tips to Understanding EMV Fraud 
Liability Shift, CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.creditcards.com/ 
credit-card-news/understanding-EMV-fraud-liability-shift-1271.php 
[https://perma.cc/UW76-QFDQ]. 
 4. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EMV 
CHIP CARD TRANSITION: BACKGROUND, STATUS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, Summary 
(2016). 
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colloquial moniker for the EMV standard.5 In the U.S., however, the 
EMV rollout maintained signature as the primary point-of-sale (POS) 
authentication method, and in December 2017, the four major 
payment card networks announced that by April 2018 they would 
make the signature requirement optional for EMV-enabled cards.6 
This transition has been costly and not without controversy. 
According to one estimate, chip-enabled cards cost as much as two 
dollars each to manufacture, compared with “pennies” for magnetic-
stripe cards.7 Large card issuers may have tens of millions of cards 
outstanding at any given time because many consumers have multiple 
bank-issued credit cards, in addition to debit cards and certain store 
credit cards.8 Thus, issuing new cards alone is likely to end up costing 
issuers at least tens of millions of dollars.9 It is estimated that a new 
EMV sales terminal costs roughly $500 to $1,000, a nontrivial cost for 
a very small business.10 For a larger business with more than one 
checkout register, the investment in new equipment could add up to 
several thousand dollars—and potentially millions of dollars for the 
largest chains. In addition, many consumers and merchants have 
complained about the additional complexity and time it takes to 
checkout when using EMV cards, including the aggravation of 
canceled sales when the consumer removes the card prematurely.11 
                                                   
 5. Nicolas Beique, Understanding EMV Chip Card Tech., HELCIM (Oct. 5, 
2016), https://www.helcim.com/article/emv-chip-card-technology/ 
 [https://perma.cc/BV3Y-JZA8]. 
 6. See John Egan, Mastercard, Discover, AmEx and Now Visa Will Ditch 
Signatures, CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-
card-news/signatures-soon-may-not-be-required.php [https://perma.cc/KVU3-
49TN]. 
 7. See Olga Kharif & Blanca Vázquez Toness, Target Breach Spurs Retail 
Rush to Accept Tougher Credit Cards, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-10/target-breach-spurs-retail-
rush-to-accept-tougher-credit-cards [https://perma.cc/2B2W-MLUN]. These 
estimated cost disparities may shrink over time due to economies of scale in card 
production, but chip cards will remain more expensive to produce than magnetic stripe 
cards. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. (“We’ve got 10 million cards in inventory out in the field . . . . At $2, 
we are probably looking at a $20 million investment, which I am going to defer for as 
long as possible.”). 
 10. See id. Other estimates say the range is as wide as $100 to $1,500 per 
terminal. See How Much Will Chip/PIN Cost to Implement?, BLUEPAY BLOG (Feb. 
23, 2015), https://www.bluepay.com/blog/how-much-will-chippin-cost-implement/ 
[https://perma.cc/FTQ2-45D5]. 
 11. Kate Ashford, Chip Cards Take So Long, Some Retailers Disabled Them 
for the Holidays, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kateashford/2015/12/27/chip-cards-take-too-long/#74e11a5c7a3b 
[https://perma.cc/T9GU-UFJP] . 
 A Chip Off the Old Block 873 
Many of the merchants initially balked at these costs, complaining 
especially that what they will spend in precautions far exceeds the 
benefits from reduced fraud for their small shops.12 According to a 
survey by Wells Fargo’s small business group in July 2015, only 29% 
of merchants had planned to upgrade to EMV-enabled card 
processors.13 Twenty-one percent stated that they never intended to 
adopt EMV-compatible terminals, and another 16% did not know 
whether they would do so.14 Of those who stated that they did not 
intend to upgrade before October 2015, 21% stated that they never 
planned to upgrade and would simply stop accepting payment cards at 
the POS.15 Forty-six percent stated that they did not want to pay for 
the EMV terminal, and 41% stated that they were not concerned about 
the liability shift.16 Despite these gripes, EMV adoption has spread 
very quickly. By June 2016, 88% of MasterCard-branded credit cards 
already had chips17 and by June 2018 69% of Visa’s cards had chips;18 
Visa reports that by June 2018, 67% of U.S. storefront merchants have 
installed EMV compatible terminals and 97% of overall U.S. payment 
volume was on EMV cards.19 Importantly, this adoption appears to be 
                                                   
 12. See Anthony Sabella, Chip Card Access Puts Service Fees on Credit 
Card Use at Local Businesses, ABC12 (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.abc12.com/ 
home/headlines/Chip-card-access-puts-service-fees-on-credit-card-use-at-local-
businesses-392677441.html [https://perma.cc/4MJ4-TK3B]. It has been reported that 
one small retailer in Michigan assesses a 3.75% surcharge on debit and credit cards, 
which the owner contends is to defray the cost of adopting EMV machines. See id. 
The owner commented, “To convert my old system into a chip reader, you’re talking 
thousands in software.” Id. 
 13. See Wells Fargo Survey: Many Small Businesses Not Ready for EMV 
Chip Cards, WELLS FARGO (Aug. 6, 2015), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-
release/community-banking-and-small-business/wells-fargo-survey-many-small-
businesses-not [https://perma.cc/2FE9-SFQR] [hereinafter Wells Fargo Survey]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. David Bixenspan, Chip Credit Card Adoption Reaqches 88% for 
MasterCard in the US, MOTHERBOARD.VICE.COM (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmv57m/chip-credit-card-adoption-first-
year.  
 18. Visa Chip Card Update, VISA (June 2018), https://usa.visa.com/visa-
everywhere/security/visa-chip-card-stats.html [https://perma.cc/G5TN-LX9A]. 
 19. Id. See also US Payments Forum Winter 2018 Market Snapshot: EMV 
Enablement Growth in New Markets, Predictions for Contractless Payments in 
Transit, Prioritizing Online Transaction Security, U.S. PAYMENTS F. (Jan. 29, 2018), 
http://www.uspaymentsforum.org/us-payments-forum-winter-2018-market-
snapshot-emv-enablement-growth-in-new-markets-predictions-for-contactless-
payments-in-transit-prioritizing-online-transaction-security/ [https://perma.cc/Q2Y3-
JC6T] (indicating that 96% of top 200 merchants accept chip cards, and over 60% of 
purchase value is done through chip-on-chip transactions); see also US Payments 
Forum Fall 2017 Market Snapshot: Merchant EMV Chip Enablement on the 
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accompanied by a concomitant reduction in fraud. Visa reports that 
counterfeit transactions have fallen by 66% since 2015 for EMV-
compliant merchants.20 
Although some merchants complained about having to move to 
the EMV standard, others argued that it came too slowly and did not 
go far enough. For example, in federal litigation alleging antitrust 
violations, Home Depot has alleged that “Visa and MasterCard have 
long recognized that the magnetic stripe technology . . . is inherently 
insecure and fraud-prone.”21 As evidence of market power, and to 
increase interchange fees through fraud chargebacks, Visa and 
MasterCard allegedly “perpetuated the use of magnetic stripe 
technology and delayed taking steps to implement more secure 
technologies.”22  
The decision not to require PINs as part of the EMV rollout also 
has spawned litigation. Merchants have strenuously objected to this 
provision, maintaining that PINs should be required. Some large 
merchants and a class of small merchants have filed suit alleging 
various legal theories as to why the maintenance of signature 
verification violates the law.23 In Home Depot Inc. v. Visa Inc., for 
example, Home Depot alleged an antitrust conspiracy in which “Visa 
and MasterCard have acted to keep a defective product in place—
signature-authenticated cards—in order to maintain their 
supracompetitive profits that are tethered to this faulty technology.”24  
Similarly, in Kroger Co. v Visa, Inc., Kroger alleged that the 
requirement that POS terminals allow non-PIN transactions for chip 
cards was “motivated by an intention to restrain competition” and 
                                                   
Upswing, Considerations for Issuers’ First Reissuance Cycle and Getting the Market 
Ready for 3DS 2.0, U.S. PAYMENTS F. (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.uspayments 
forum.org/us-payments-forum-fall-2017-market-snapshot-merchant-emv-chip-
enablement-on-the-upswing-considerations-for-issuers-first-reissuance-cycle-and-
getting-the-market-ready-for-3ds-2-0/ [https://perma.cc/JE3Y-BL8A]. 
 20. See Visa Chip Card Update, VISA (Sept. 2017), https://usa.visa.com/ 
dam/VCOM/global/visa-everywhere/documents/visa-emvchip-september-
infographic-120417-v3A.pdf [https://perma.cc/95D7-7XFM]. 
 21. Complaint at 50, Home Depot, Inc. et. al v. Visa Inc et. al, No 1:16-CV-
05507 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2016).  
 22. Id. at 50.  
 23. See Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 24, 28, Kroger Co. 
v. Visa, Inc., No 05-CV-6409-DAB (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (seeking declaratory 
judgment for state fraud and contract claims); Home Depot Complaint, supra note 21, 
at 1 (alleging violation of federal and state antitrust laws); Amended Complaint & 
Demand for Jury Trial at 1, B & R Supermarket, Inc. v. Visa, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-
01150-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (alleging state antitrust and consumer 
protection act claims).  
 24. Home Depot Complaint, supra note 21, at 49. 
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violates the Durbin Amendment to Dodd–Frank.25 In addition to these 
private cases, state attorneys general have advocated in favor of a 
“chip and PIN” standard.26  
Against this backdrop, this Article has two primary aims. First, 
we present a positive theory of payment card security to explain the 
U.S. experience. Rather than an anticompetitive exercise of market 
power, we argue that the late adoption of EMV and the maintenance 
of signature verification are best understood as an efficient response 
to cheaper network costs in the U.S. We employ a model of optimal 
care in which a payment card network chooses a level of care that 
minimizes the sum of fraud costs and friction costs. Steps to reduce 
fraud inevitably introduce friction into the system.27 For example, 
consider a regime that requires a consumer to present three types of 
identification for every payment card transaction—this measure 
clearly would decrease fraud, but, at the same time, it would 
dramatically increase the cost of making even the simplest transaction.  
Not only do the networks balance friction and fraud, but they 
also choose between reducing fraud through the network or at the 
POS. For example, requiring more types of identification at the POS 
acts as a substitute for information on whether the card has been 
reported lost or stolen. Conceptually, this second level of analysis of 
how to best provide security is nested within the higher level of 
analysis of the optimal level of security overall. At the same time, 
these two questions are intermingled: While the relative marginal 
costs and productivities of different security measures will determine 
their relative utilization, the absolute values of these marginal costs 
and productivities will determine the optimal tradeoff between 
security and friction. We show that in making this balance, 
jurisdictions with higher network costs will rely more heavily on POS 
methods and vice versa.  
We use this framework to explain the late U.S. migration to 
EMV. Because of comparatively lower telecommunications costs, the 
U.S. traditionally has enjoyed far lower costs of verifying transactions 
                                                   
 25. Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Kroger, supra note 23, at 
3; see also generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
12 U.S.C. 53 (2012). 
 26. See, e.g., Press Release, Conn. Office of the Attorney Gen., AG Jepsen 
and Eight Attorneys General Call for Expedited Implementation of Chip and PIN 
Credit Card Technology (Nov. 16, 2015), https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-
Releases/2015-Press-Releases/AG-Jepsen-and-Eight-Attorneys-General-Call-for-
Expedited-Implementation-of-Chip-and-PIN-Credit-Card [https://perma.cc/FT8P-
BFCG]. 
 27. See Richard J. Sullivan, The U.S. Adoption of Computer-Chip Payment 
Cards: Implications for Payment Fraud, 2013 ECON. REV. 59, 60. 
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through the network process than the European Union (EU), which 
has meant that EU merchants typically cannot rely on network as a 
real-time measure against fraud. As such, it is efficient for EU 
merchants to take extra measures at the POS to assure that the person 
presenting the card is an authorized user, which is exactly what chip 
and PIN provides.28 On the other hand, in the U.S. nearly 100% of 
transactions are checked through the payment card networks.29 This 
allows the merchant to know—nearly instantaneously—if the card has 
been reported lost or stolen, if the user is over the credit limit, or if the 
transaction is sufficiently out of the ordinary for the authorized user 
that it raises red flags.30 Further, we find that using a liability shift 
rather than a government (or private) mandate to move to EMV is 
efficient when there is heterogeneity in the benefits from adopting 
certain security measures.31 Thus, by adopting a rule that allows firms 
to opt into a security standard only if doing so reduces total fraud 
losses and costs of care, the U.S. would harness private information 
and maximize network value. 
Because the optimal allocation between network and POS 
measures will vary depending on costs and productivity, our 
framework implies that no particular security technology (such as 
Chip and PIN) is likely to be universally efficient across different 
economies or even within the same economy over time. For this 
reason, moving to EMV without the PIN verification appears to be 
cost justified in the U.S. Although requiring a PIN would add an extra 
layer of protection, the marginal costs of doing so do not appeared 
justified by the benefits in a world with nearly 100% network 
authentication. The inclusion of PIN authentication adds only 
marginal protection against unauthorized use of lost or stolen cards 
that have yet to be reported as such—with real time network 
                                                   
 28. See, e.g., Steven Murdoch et al., Chip and PIN Is Broken, 2010 IEEE 
SYMP. SECURITY & PRIVACY 433, 433. 
 29. See FED. RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENT STUDY – 2017 
ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT 5 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
pressreleases/files/2017-payment-systems-study-annual-supplement-20171221.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HMB-UKGS]. 
 30. See, e.g., Brian Martucci, How Credit Card Payment Processing Systems 
& Networks Really Work, MONEY CRASHERS https://www.moneycrashers.com/credit-
card-payment-processing-systems-networks/ [https://perma.cc/Y5UQ-HWWR] (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 31. See Preparing for EMV Mandate in the U.S., WORLDPAY, 
https://www.vantiv.com/vantage-point/safer-payments/emv-chip-card-technology 
[https://perma.cc/95NV-A6G9] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
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authentication, cards reported as lost or stolen will be rejected.32 At the 
same time, a PIN requirement will increase transaction times and false 
rejections due to forgotten PINs. We hasten to add that we are not 
arguing that chip and signature is the one uniquely efficient security 
regime; instead, it should be seen as one of a possible range of 
approaches, any of which might be reasonable and none of which 
imply the presence of a market failure. Although it is theoretically 
possible that chip and PIN—now twenty years old and developed in 
an era before cheap telecommunications costs, smart phones, and 
biometrically authenticated payments—is the single efficient and ideal 
technology for today’s payments environment, it is by no means 
obvious. In short, there is no reason to believe that the decision to 
adopt EMV without PIN verification is the result of a market failure 
or monopoly power instead of reflecting a reasonable accommodation 
of marginal benefits and costs in a highly dynamic market. This 
conclusion seems especially compelling given the rapid changes in the 
consumer payments market, such as the rapid growth of contactless 
payments, including things like ApplePay and new methods of 
cardholder verification, such as biometric identifiers or usage of Big 
Data-based methods of triangulation, for instance geolocating 
consumer phones or other unique individual identifiers.33 
The second goal of this Article is to offer an alternative 
explanation for the debate over the lack of a PIN requirement in the 
U.S. rooted in Dodd–Frank’s regulation of interchange fees. Although 
couched as an issue of consumer protection, the true driver of these 
controversies over PIN can be explained by public choice. While 
credit transactions and signature debit transactions are routed through 
the major payment card networks, merchants can route debit 
transactions through third-party networks, which tend to charge lower 
interchange fees.34 Viewed through this prism, the calls for a PIN 
verification mandate are less about protecting consumers from fraud 
and more about interchange fees. That is, merchants appear to be using 
the EMV rollout as a fulcrum to steer consumers through cheaper PIN 
                                                   
 32. See Merchant Credit Card Fraud Prevention Tips, AUTHORIZE (Feb. 26, 
2018), https://support.authorize.net/s/article/Merchant-Credit-Card-Fraud-
Prevention-Tips [https://perma.cc/5YGE-9KAP]. 
 33. See Madhvi Mavadiya, Does Sport Have Its Finger On The Pulse Of 
Biometrics?, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/madhvimavadiya/ 
2018/10/08/does-sport-have-its-finger-on-the-pulse-of-biometrics/#44aa6c143a68 
[https://perma.cc/GM6B-J4D4]. 
 34. See Paul Paradis, Payment Wars: A New Hope, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/04/25/payment-wars-a-
new-hope/#77e1aa9239fc [https://perma.cc/P2FR-KYRT]. 
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debit networks.35 In this manner, the debate over PIN verification is 
just the latest front in the ongoing war between the payment card 
networks and merchants over interchange fees.36  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we lay out the basic 
economic tradeoff between security and payment friction. Part II 
introduces our model of bilateral precautions and derives some 
comparative static results that help explain why certain jurisdictions 
may rely on relatively higher levels of POS or network security. Part 
III examines recent U.S. and EU experiences with EMV through the 
lens of our model. Part IV uses our framework to examine the relative 
costs and benefits of including PIN verification as part of EMV in the 
U.S., finding strong reasons to doubt that a PIN mandate would 
improve welfare. Given our findings in Part IV, Part V examines the 
political economy of the ongoing merchant litigation and lobbying 
efforts to mandate PIN as the cardholder verification method (CVM) 
for EMV cards, finding that these attempts are more easily explained 
as an attempt by merchants to leverage the Durbin Amendment to 
Dodd–Frank for financial gain rather than to reduce card fraud. The 
final section summarizes the Article and offers some conclusions.  
 
I. PAYMENT FRICTION AND PAYMENT SECURITY: 
THE ECONOMIC TRADEOFF 
Assessing the optimal set of rules and institutions governing the 
payment card system is extremely complex.37 As noted, the inquiry 
involves tradeoffs at two interrelated levels of analysis: first, to find 
the optimal level of security (the fraud-friction tradeoff) and second, 
once the optimal level of security is established, to identify the optimal 
mix of security technologies that will provide the highest level of 
security at the lowest cost. The global payment card system is one of 
the most complex and efficient financial institutions in the history of 
the world: a twenty-four hour, secure, globally interconnected, 
instantaneous network of consumers, card networks, issuers, and 
merchants that reaches to the farthest corners of the world. Merchants 
gain access to near-instantaneous payments without the risk, delay, 
                                                   
 35. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2277 (2018) 
(describing the process of “steering”). 
 36. A high-profile front in this war is the antitrust case against American 
Express (Visa and MasterCard settled) concerning interchange fees, which the 
Supreme Court decided last year. See id. 
 37. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees 
and the Limits of Regulation 47 (George Mason Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 
10-26, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624002 
[https://perma.cc/6B79-SMUQ]. 
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and cost associated with checks and cash.38 Consumers gain the 
flexibility and safety of not having to carry cash, thereby avoiding the 
risk of theft or loss as well as the cost and inconvenience of acquiring 
cash from an automated teller machine (ATM) or bank teller.39 In 
addition, in higher interest-rate conditions, the process enables 
consumers to keep their funds in interest-bearing accounts instead of 
carrying depreciating cash in their wallets.40 Governments gain from 
the widespread use of electronic payments by not having to print cash, 
and they also benefit from the reduction of crime and tax evasion as 
consumers transition away from cash payments.41 Worldwide, billions 
of payment card transactions occur every day with an astonishing 
degree of accuracy, speed, and security.42 In addition, for many 
consumers in the U.S., access to this system has been virtually free, as 
for several decades most consumers have been able to acquire credit 
cards with no annual fee and no interest charge if the cardholder pays 
his or her bill in full every month.43 Indeed, once cash back and other 
rewards are considered, some consumers may actually be paying a 
negative price for the ownership and use of their cards.44 
When cardholders interact with the payment card system, they 
experience a near-seamless and simple transaction.45 A consumer 
swipes or inserts a card, and within seconds the transaction is approved 
and the consumer is on his or her way.46 But like the proverbial tip of 
the iceberg, the simplicity of the consumer experience obscures the 
massively complicated system that lies beneath.47 In particular, behind 
this simple consumer interface rests a series of tradeoffs that crucially 
determine the efficiency of the payment card system.48 
From an economic perspective, at the most fundamental and 
overarching level, the efficiency of the payment card system rests on 
a tradeoff between the speed and flexibility of the system (often called 
the friction of using the system) and the security of payment card use 
on the other.49 Consumers, merchants, card issuers, and card networks 
                                                   
 38. See id. at 2. 
 39. See id. at 1. 
 40. See id. at 17. 
 41. See id. at 21. 
 42. See id. at 1. 
 43. See id. at 6. 
 44. This phenomenon, in which consumers pay a subsidized, zero, or even 
negative price, is common in two-sided markets such as payment cards, newspapers, 
Internet search engines, and the like. See id. at 32. 
 45. See id. at 36. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 36-37. 
 48. See id. at 36. 
 49. See id. at 25-26. 
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seek a payment experience that is as frictionless as possible—that is, 
the fastest possible speed and convenience of payment.50 This 
minimization of friction has many elements, but they all rest on the 
basic observation that no one goes to Macy’s, Starbucks, or 
Amazon.com to partake of the payment experience.51 The payment 
part of a transaction is the prototype of what economists refer to as 
transaction costs—namely, the necessary costs of accomplishing the 
parties’ central goal, which is to buy and sell goods and services.52 
Payment friction takes several basic forms.53 First is the speed of 
payments (how quickly they can be authenticated) and the final 
decision whether to approve or decline a transaction.54 Second, friction 
increases when there are higher levels of incorrect declinations of 
legitimate transactions (for example, when consumers incorrectly 
enter their PIN numbers or the card network incorrectly rejects a 
transaction as fraudulent, which require additional time and effort to 
reprocess the transaction).55 A third form of payment friction is the 
direct cost to the consumer and merchant—for example, the cost to 
consumers of transacting business (such as the costs of carrying a card 
or replacing a lost or damaged card) and the cost to the merchant of 
maintaining payment-processing equipment.56 The merchant’s cost 
includes not only the direct costs of acquiring and maintaining certain 
equipment and dealing with repairs to broken equipment, but also the 
costs associated with the location of terminals in stores and the 
payment experience of consumers and merchants as part of a 
transaction.57 
In this Section, we first examine the types of security risks 
attendant to payment card use. We then consider the frictions 
introduced by some security measures. 
A. Security Risks 
Payment card fraud broadly can be defined as any improper 
charge to an account made without the cardholder’s awareness and 
consent.58 The channels through which payment card fraud occur vary. 
                                                   
 50. See id. at 6. 
 51. See id. at 39. 
 52. See id. at 36. 
 53. See id. at 5. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 19. 
 56. See id. at 11. 
 57. See id.  
 58. See What is Credit Card Fraud?, LIFELOCK, https://www.lifelock.com/ 
learn-fraud-what-is-credit-card-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/Z832-Q5RC]. 
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Ultimately, though, all channels involve an unauthorized user having 
access to sufficient account information to pose as an authorized user. 
Such information may include the credit card number, the expiration 
date, and the customer verification number on the back of a card. 
Fraudsters can get this information through a variety of channels.59 
First, a card may be lost or stolen.60 Second, credit card information 
may be compromised without loss or theft of the physical card.61 This 
form of access can occur through physical interaction (e.g., a waiter 
or clerk writing down a credit card number) or through more 
technologically sophisticated means.62 For example, “skimming” 
occurs when a thief places a small device at an ATM or a merchant’s 
card reader that collects the information on cards’ magnetic strips.63 
The thief later returns to retrieve the device.64 
Similarly, large databases of credit card information held by 
merchants increasingly have become the target of identity thieves, as 
was the case in the widely publicized breaches at Michaels, Home 
Depot, and (probably most prominently) Target.65 Each of those 
breaches came about as a result of inadequate security precautions by 
the retailers.66 With respect to Michaels, for example, the attack was 
remarkably low tech: It has been reported that the criminals physically 
replaced devices at cashier checkout lanes at eighty Michaels locations 
in nineteen states.67 The terminals were infected with malware that 
collected the card numbers and expiration dates of approximately 2.6 
million cards over an eight-month period before the breach was 
detected.68 
The Target breach, by contrast, was much more elaborate. 
Hackers tapped into the computer network of one of Target’s heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) vendors, stealing the 
                                                   
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Latoya Irby, How Credit Card Skimming Works, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/how-credit-card-skimming-works-960773 
[https://perma.cc/PR7H-Z5RE] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Tracy Kitten, Michaels Breach: What We’ve Learned, 
BANKINFOSECURITY (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/-p-1910 
[https://perma.cc/V4EF-RL9G]. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Michaels Data Breach Response: 7 Facts, 
DARK READING (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-
breaches/michaels-data-breach-response-7-facts/d/d-id/1204630 
[https://perma.cc/JG7Z-K45W]. 
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vendor’s credentials and installing malware on its system.69 The 
hackers then used the vendor’s credentials to gain access to an area of 
Target’s computer network, where they installed malware on Target’s 
system.70 Because Target lacked adequate firewalls and other security 
devices between vendor operations and the consumer sections of 
Target’s system that held consumer data, the hackers were able to 
install malware initially only on Target’s vendor system but then were 
able to use that point of entry to obtain consumer data.71 The hackers 
then sent the malware through Target’s computer system to cashier 
stations in all domestic Target stores.72 Soon, credit card numbers 
started flowing out of the registers and into several servers in the U.S. 
before they were apparently routed to Moscow.73 The outflow of card 
numbers continued for several days despite alarms within Target’s 
system that a breach had occurred.74 In the end, the Target data breach 
resulted in the theft of approximately 40 million credit card numbers.75 
The breach affected all 1,797 of Target’s U.S. stores.76 
Home Depot’s breach was similar to Target’s in that its network 
was compromised by gaining access through a third-party vendor’s 
stolen credentials.77 Once the hackers gained access to the system, they 
were able to install “unique, custom-built malware” on self-checkout 
systems in the U.S. and Canada.78 They used that malware to steal 
information on approximately 56 million credit and debit cards and to 
steal email addresses for another 53 million consumers.79 Home Depot 
did not confirm that the breach had occurred until a week after credit 
card data linked to its customers went up for sale on the black-market 
                                                   
 69. See Jai Vijayan, New Details of Home Depot Attack Reminiscent of 
Target’s Breach, DARK READING (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/new-details-of-home-depot-attack-
reminiscent-of-targets-breach/d/d-id/1317323 [https://perma.cc/ZU6E-BATR]; see 
also Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: 
How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-warnings-in-epic-hack-of-credit-card-data 
[https://perma.cc/QU34-Z9AZ]. 
 70. See Riley et al., supra note 69. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Vijayan, supra note 69. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Michael Winter, Home Depot Hackers Used Vendor Log-On to Steal 
Data, E-mails, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/business/2014/11/06/home-depot-hackers-stolen-data/18613167/ 
[https://perma.cc/2UCM-KNPE]. 
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website Rescator.cc.80 The breach continued for months and occurred 
despite the fact that Home Depot had software that could have 
encrypted consumer data and thereby reduced the risk of the theft.81 In 
addition, just months before the major breach, the company had 
suffered two minor breaches yet still chose not to deploy software that 
could have prevented the consumer data from being stolen.82 It has 
also been reported that Home Depot was using outdated antivirus 
software in its stores.83 
When data are skimmed or breached, there is likely to be a longer 
lag time between theft and discovery than for stolen cards. It will 
almost always take the card owner less time to discover that a physical 
card is missing than to discover fraudulent charges, which may not be 
evident until the bill is viewed. As discussed later in this Article, fraud-
detection techniques are helping to close this gap. 
Thieves use stolen payment card information in various ways. 
Criminals commit so-called card-not-present (CNP) fraud, which 
occurs when card information is used to purchase goods or services 
online, over the phone, or in other circumstances in which the seller 
doesn’t need access to the physical card.84 When only the card 
information is compromised, such as through skimming or data 
breaches, the information is often sold in bulk on the so-called dark 
web.85 
                                                   
 80. See Benjamin Elgin et al., Home Depot Hacked After Months of Security 
Warnings, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
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 82. See id. 
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 84. See, e.g., Amy Fontinelle, Card-Not-Present Fraud, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 
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[https://perma.cc/BP9E-HASW] (defining card-not-present fraud). 
 85. See JFC, The Life of a Stolen Credit Card, DEEPDOTWEB (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.deepdotweb.com/2016/06/27/life-stolen-credit-card/ 
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Card Market as Slick as This, MOTHERBOARD BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/weve-never-seen-a-stolen-credit-card-market-as-
slick-as-this [https://perma.cc/UX7Y-XUJL]. Although an in-depth analysis found 
that claim to be exaggerated, it did verify that at least 50,000 card numbers were 
available for sale at that time. See id.  
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Stolen numbers also can be encoded onto counterfeit cards with 
easily obtainable technology.86 According to a report by the Aite 
Group produced prior to the liability shift, counterfeit fraud was the 
largest category of credit card fraud, accounting for 45% of losses, 
followed by CNP fraud, which accounted for 38% of losses.87 Lost and 
stolen cards accounted for only 9% of losses.88 According to the 
Federal Reserve’s analysis of fraud losses on debit cards, in 2015 lost 
and stolen fraud losses accounted for about 1.0–1.5 basis points as a 
share of transaction value for PIN and signature debit.89 By contrast, 
“the majority of fraud losses for single-message debit transactions 
[i.e., PIN debit] were attributed to counterfeit fraud.” Overall, fraud 
losses from counterfeit cards were 3.1 basis points per transaction 
value for PIN debit and 5.4 basis points for signature debit.90 For 
signature debit, by contrast, 56% of fraud losses were from card-not-
present fraud, amounting to roughly seven basis points per transaction 
value.91 
B. Types of Security 
Payment card networks use a variety of means to reduce card-
present (CP) fraud (e.g., fraud at a physical point of sale), including 
protections at the merchant POS as well as through the network. 
Broadly, POS methods focus on verifying the identity of the card 
presenter, whereas network security focuses on whether the card itself 
is valid or whether the transaction suggests fraud. 
                                                   
 86. See JFC, supra note 85 (discussing how a thief may create a counterfeit 
credit card). 
 87. See THAD PETERSON & JULIE CONROY, CHIP CARDS IN THE UNITED 
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 A Chip Off the Old Block 885 
1. Point of Sale 
When a card is presented for payment at a merchant terminal, 
the merchant can use several nonmutually exclusive techniques to 
verify that the user of the card is authorized. For example, the 
merchant can check the ID of the person presenting the card or 
examine the signature on the receipt or device capture to see if it 
matches the signature on the back of the card. In some cases (primarily 
for debit cards), the presenter also may have to enter a PIN or other 
identifying information, such as a zip code. Biometric identifiers, such 
as fingerprints, retina scans, and facial recognition, increasingly are 
being used as identifiers as well. 
An additional dimension of CP security involves securing the 
data transmitted from the card to the terminal at the time of the 
transaction. As previously noted, fraud is primarily from card 
information captured during transmission or stolen from databases. As 
will be discussed in more detail later, EMV is a POS security method 
that reduces the fraudsters’ ability to complete a transaction with a 
counterfeit card by transmitting a transaction-specific number rather 
than a static account number. Mobile devices reduce the ability of 
thieves to capture account information by encrypting it during 
transmission.92 
2. Network 
Security is also performed at the network (or issuer) level. For 
example, the issuing bank will deny a card that has been reported as 
lost or stolen or if there is evidence that it has been compromised. 
Further, algorithms are used to determine whether a transaction is 
inconsistent with normal use (for example, because the card is being 
used in a different area or for a very large purchase). 
C. Frictions from Security 
Security is necessary to deter fraudsters, but it comes at a cost. 
Obviously, there are direct fixed costs to employing security, such as 
building (or upgrading) network infrastructures and purchasing EMV 
terminals. However, there are also marginal costs—precaution costs 
per transaction—that have important implications for determining the 
                                                   
 92. See, e.g., Apple Pay Security and Privacy Overview, APPLE, 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203027 [https://perma.cc/EZ92-9PG4] (last 
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optimal level of security. Broadly, these costs are associated with 
frictions introduced into the payment system, and they fall into two 
bins: (a) reductions in speed and convenience and (b) an increase in 
false positives. 
1. Payment Speed and Convenience 
Consumers and merchants seek a speedy, convenient, and low-
cost method of making payments. Speed is of particular importance 
for many merchants as they seek to maximize the throughput of their 
customer experience and minimize the store’s labor costs of dealing 
with the transaction of processing payments. Consider a simple 
intuitive example: Assume that it takes ten seconds longer for a 
merchant to process a payment using a slower payment device like a 
check, than a faster one like a credit card. Even at this small marginal 
difference in time, if there are six people in a checkout line, this delay 
will increase the checkout time for the sixth person in line by one 
minute, and so on. From the perspective of the merchant, however, the 
effect is even larger: For a large merchant who conducts hundreds or 
thousands of transactions a day, these small increments could add up 
to hundreds or thousands of dollars of additional labor costs each year 
as employees simply wait for transactions to clear. The increments 
may also require a retailer to maintain additional registers and may 
lead to some abandoned sales. 
Over time, the coevolution of information technology, 
telecommunications infrastructure, and consumer and merchant 
demand for faster payment times has dramatically reduced the friction 
associated with the consumer payments system. In the U.S., for 
example, the average transaction time to make a payment of less than 
twenty-five dollars at a quick-service restaurant is only four to five 
seconds for a payment card, which is substantially faster than even 
cash (eight to ten seconds).93 For payments at discount stores or 
grocery stores, a recent estimate was that the average time was 
approximately seventeen seconds for a cash payment, seventeen to 
nineteen seconds for a debit card transaction, and fifty-seven seconds 
for a check.94 This reduction in processing time has contributed to the 
increased ubiquity in the acceptance of payment cards.95 For example, 
                                                   
 93. Anne Layne-Farrar, Are Debit Cards Really More Costly for Merchants? 
Assessing Retailers’ Costs and Benefits of Payment Instrument Acceptance 7 (Charles 
River Assocs. & Nw. Univ., Working Paper, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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 94. Id. at 51. 
 95. See id. at 7. 
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in 2003, McDonald’s made the decision to accept payment cards.96 As 
a result of that decision, the value of McDonald’s stock increased by 
2.7%.97 Other quick-service restaurants have also benefited from 
accepting payment cards, both because of reduced costs of handling 
cash and also because of faster throughput and so-called ticket lift 
from increased size in the average sale.98 These effects can be 
significant; according to one estimate, each ten-second increment that 
can be cut from the average drive-through time is worth approximately 
$1,000 in revenue for a typical restaurant.99 
This desire to reduce the friction of payments and the costs to 
the consumer and merchant explains many important retail trends of 
recent years. For example, consider the development of self-checkout 
lines at many stores (e.g., grocery stores, drugstores, and hardware 
stores) or transactions with unmanned kiosks at locations such as gas 
stations, train stations, and vending machines. In all these locations, 
the ubiquity of electronic payments has enabled some consumers to 
forgo an interaction with a sales clerk, thereby speeding the checkout 
process, enabling the merchant to reduce the number of employees 
assigned to the routine work of ringing up consumers and freeing up 
employees for other, more important tasks.100 Paying at the pump at 
gas stations, for example, (a) saves the consumer the time and effort 
of walking to and from the cash register (usually twice in the case of 
a payment card transaction), (b) saves time and reduces lines at the 
checkout counter (especially during busy times), and (c) allows the 
station to reduce the number of employees.101 Self-checkout at grocery 
stores also speeds up checkout time, permits reductions in employee 
staffing and redeployment of employees to other useful activities, and 
even takes up less floor space than traditional checkout lanes.102 
The switch to EMV illustrates the tradeoff between security and 
friction. It was expected that, as consumers and merchants became 
more familiar with EMV payments, average checkout times would not 
                                                   
 96. See id. 
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 99. See Jeffrey Green, Fast Food Meets Fast Payment, PAYMENTSSOURCE 
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 100. See Garit Boothe, The Pros and Cons of Using Self-Checkouts, 
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888 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
be much longer than when using traditional magnetic-stripe 
technology.103 Yet according to an article in the Wall Street Journal in 
August 2016, it still took twice as long to pay with a chip card than 
with a swipe or mobile payment—on average, thirteen seconds versus 
six seconds; over the span of a year, a consumer could spend eighty-
five extra minutes standing in line to pay.104 But note—that is just the 
extra time it takes for one person to pay. If there are, say, five people 
in line, the person at the end of the line could wait more than half a 
minute longer in line just because of the delay in payment times. 
According to one estimate, the average consumer will spend five and 
a half hours per year waiting for EMV transactions to go through, and 
businesses will experience 116 million hours of additional checkout 
time as a result of EMV.105 
A similar economic tradeoff applies to analyzing the rapidly 
growing world of e-commerce and online shopping. Consider the 
decision of whether to store one’s credit card number with 
Amazon.com, iTunes, or some other online merchant. The costs of 
such a decision are obvious: It is possible that the merchant’s website 
might get hacked and one’s payment card information might be 
compromised. On the other hand, the benefits of permitting 
Amazon.com to store your payment card information are sizable: 
access to Amazon’s “1-Click Ordering” feature and the ability to make 
purchases without having to reenter one’s payment card number for 
each transaction.106 Many consumers are willing to accept the slight 
risk of a possible compromise of their credit card number to capture 
the efficiency and convenience of storing one’s credit card 
information online, as long as they feel that the merchant is credible 
and committed to security. 
On the other hand, at the same time that these innovations have 
reduced payment friction and enabled additional efficiencies related 
to payments, they have also raised novel problems of fraud. For 
example, when a credit card is stolen, often the first place the thief 
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tries to use it is at a self-service gas station or subway ticket kiosk. 
Why? Because the impersonal nature of the interface enables the thief 
to verify whether the card is still active without risking a confrontation 
with a sales clerk if the transaction is declined. Thus, although these 
sorts of innovations present huge benefits to consumers and merchants 
in terms of reducing payment friction, this reduction in friction for 
legitimate transactions also can come at a cost of increasing the 
potential for illegitimate transactions. 
This tradeoff between the costs and benefits of reducing payment 
friction at the risk of some higher incidence of fraud is also reflected 
in the decision by payment card networks to adopt policies that permit 
many merchants to waive CVM requirements for transactions below 
a certain size to speed the checkout process. Granted, elimination of 
this authentication requirement would be expected to increase the 
incidence of payment card fraud overall. However, apparently the 
payment networks and merchants who choose to forgo CVM have 
implicitly decided that the costs of increased fraud with respect to 
some small-dollar transactions are outweighed by the benefits of faster 
throughput at the register and the small size of the transactions. 
Moreover, as detailed later in this Article, the elimination of the 
signature requirement for some small-dollar transactions does not 
mean an absence of any security protocols whatsoever—instead, 
merchants are just eliminating the marginal cost and marginal benefit 
of requiring a signature authentication. At the same time, the network 
retains its full apparatus of authorization and authentication protocols. 
Moreover, the application of these waivers and exceptions to ordinary 
procedures is highly calibrated and is tied to specific merchants, 
industries, geographic locations, and the like, all of which affect the 
tradeoffs between reducing payment friction at the margin and the 
marginal impact on payment security. 
Finally, consumers seem to understand the tradeoff as well. 
Although consumers express support for EMV as a means to increase 
data security, they also have expressed frustration with it, mainly from 
increased friction in transactions and longer checkout times.107 
According to one analysis conducted soon after the liability shift 
occurred, the time needed to pay using a chip card was on average 
seven to ten seconds, as compared with two to three seconds using a 
magnetic-stripe card.108 The survey also found that 20% of users said 
                                                   
 107. See Harbortouch Survey: 20 Percent of Users Say EMV Payments Take 
Too Long, GREEN SHEET (Nov. 16, 2015, 12:18 PM), http://www.greensheet.com/ 
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that EMV payments “take too long.”109 In addition, after having had 
experience with chip cards, “nearly four times as many survey 
respondents [were] worried about speedy processing times over chip 
card security or availability of EMV terminals.”110 Consumers also 
have had to deal with extended hassles and delay from removing the 
card from the reader prematurely and having the transaction canceled, 
resulting in further delay and frustration.111 A survey by the Mercator 
Advisory Group in November 2015 found that 28% of EMV 
cardholders were bothered or confused by the EMV card or tried to 
avoid shopping at stores that required them to use it.112 A September 
2016 survey by Square found even higher levels of discontent, 
reporting that 91% of debit card users and 87% of credit card users 
were “frustrated” with EMV cards, primarily because the cards 
increase checkout time.113 
Frustration with the slow nature of EMV transactions spurred 
efforts by card issuers, networks, and merchants to make transactions 
speedier. But the steps taken to speed up EMV transactions identifies 
the essential tradeoff between friction and security—rather than 
authenticating every transaction in real-time, acquirers periodically 
upload data to card terminals in stores, which permits localized 
authentication of transactions.114 Locally stored data is later 
periodically uploaded to the network from the local terminal.115 While 
this process increases the speed of processing transactions, at the same 
time it also increases the potential for fraud because data stored on the 
local terminal can often be several hours old before the local terminal 
communicates with the network. 
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cards-technology-security/ [https://perma.cc/3EV6-2UUK] (last visited Dec. 17, 
2018). 
 115. See id. 
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2. Accurate Authentication of Payment Card Transactions 
Minimizing payment friction also includes accurately processing 
and approving transactions. In particular, as a first approximation this 
means that the payment system must approve all legitimate 
transactions the first time they are attempted. If a legitimate 
transaction is incorrectly declined and must be attempted a second 
time, the costs and friction of the system increase. Again, at an 
intuitive level, consider a card transaction that is improperly declined, 
thereby leading the consumer to have to pull another card from his or 
her wallet and reattempt the transaction. Having to repeat the 
transaction increases the transaction costs of making the payment and 
the attendant costs in terms of inconvenience to customers as well as 
labor and other costs to the merchant. 
The costs of payment friction, especially for inaccurate 
declinations of legitimate transactions, can be especially high in some 
contexts. For the average consumer, for example, the cost of a 
declination of an attempted transaction using a debit card is higher 
than that of a declination using a credit card. This is because, although 
many consumers carry more than one credit card (and thus can simply 
pull an alternative card from their wallet), few consumers carry more 
than one debit card.116 In addition, many households (especially 
younger and lower-income households) do not have a credit card and 
therefore rely almost entirely on using their debit card to conduct 
electronic transactions.117 In that situation, as a result, an improper 
transaction declination can have high costs in terms of wasted time 
and energy for both the consumer and the merchant. 
Approval of payment card transactions thus presents a classic 
tradeoff between type I and type II errors—that is, false positives and 
false negatives. One can easily see that when a thief uses a stolen card 
to make an improper payment, there is a cost to the payments system 
that must be allocated in some fashion among the consumer, merchant, 
issuer, and card network. Yet it should be recognized that there is also 
a cost when a legitimate payment is declined. Most trivially, there is a 
cost in terms of the time needed to try the transaction again using the 
same card or a different card. But in some instances there may be a 
larger cost—the cost of not being able to conduct the transaction at all 
if the consumer has no other payment device available. For example, 
if the card is being used to buy baby formula, medicine, or gasoline to 
                                                   
 116. Jason Steele, Debit Card Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM, 
https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/debit-card-statistics-1276.php 
[https://perma.cc/R9RV-89QK] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 117. See id. 
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get to work in the morning, there can be a substantial cost to a 
consumer if that payment is incorrectly declined as fraudulent. 
Thus, a substantial part of the cost of the payment system is the 
development of the complex network of computer systems and 
complicated algorithms that payment networks, card issuers, and 
merchant acquirers use to more accurately distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate transactions—that is, to minimize the joint costs of each 
transaction in terms of reducing the costs of false positives (incorrect 
declinations) and false negatives (approving improper transactions). 
As should be readily apparent, the more vigilant the card networks are 
about trying to prevent unauthorized transactions, the more likely they 
will also be to inadvertently block valid transactions. 
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 1. The payment system can 
take additional care, c, to avoid fraud, which is measured on the 
horizontal axis. As it takes more care, fraud losses, L(c), decrease. At 
the same time, however, as efforts to avoid care increase, so do costs 
from increased frictions, f(c).  
 
Figure 1. Optimal Level of Fraud Precaution 
 
The goal of the system, therefore, is not to minimize fraud. 
Instead, it is to minimize the sum of fraud and friction costs, TC(c), 
which in the case of Figure 1 occurs at c*. In the next section, we 
explore more deeply how a payment system allocates care between the 
network and merchants, which is at the heart of the movement to the 
EMV standard and the chip-versus-PIN debate.  
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II. UNDERSTANDING OPTIMAL NETWORK SECURITY: 
A MODEL OF JOINT CARE 
Taking cost-effective fraud precautions will increase the 
network value to merchants and consumers and hence the profitability 
of the entire payment card ecosystem. Value maximization requires 
identifying the optimal fraud–friction tradeoff as well as the optimal 
mix of security technologies to provide the desired level of security at 
lowest cost. Of course, these two questions are interrelated, as the 
optimal tradeoff between security and friction will in part be a function 
of the cost of security technologies. Every time a consumer uses a 
payment card, there is a risk that the information will be stolen and 
used to make illicit purchases. Although consumers generally are not 
directly responsible for fraudulent charges, those charges are a cost to 
the system that ultimately gets passed on in a competitive market.118 
For example, interchange fees, which are borne by merchants and 
passed onto consumers to some degree, are in part a function of the 
level of fraud. Therefore, a payment card network has an incentive to 
minimize the total costs from fraud—both the direct costs of illicit 
transactions and the costs of preventing fraud.  
Broadly, one can imagine that networks have two leverage 
points to combat fraud: at the POS or through the network.119 This 
problem can be couched in a stylized joint care model in which the 
payment care industry would like to avoid losses from fraudulent 
transactions, L, which can be reduced by action at both the point of 
sale, P, and through the network, N.120 These actions have marginal 
costs ϕ and θ respectively. A consumer’s marginal willingness to pay 
                                                   
 118. According to the Federal Reserve, for example, in 2015 consumers 
absorbed only 3% of the losses from debit card fraud, whereas issuers absorbed 58% 
and merchants 39% (mainly from CNP fraud). See BD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., supra note 88, at 22. Although consumers are not directly responsible 
for fraud losses, they can experience costs in terms of inconvenience and indirect loss 
(such as changing credit card numbers and more closely monitoring against 
unauthorized charges), which suggests that their effective cost from card fraud is 
nonzero. In addition, consumers pay indirectly in higher card fees or higher prices for 
goods and services from fraud losses. 
 119. For purposes of simplification, we largely ignore the potential role of 
consumers in preventing fraud. The basic model of joint care that we develop could 
be generalized to create a three-way system of allocation of fraud prevention and 
insurance costs among issuers/networks, merchants, and consumers. But the 
underlying analysis is largely identical; therefore, little use is gained through that 
additional complexity. In addition, many of the actions that consumers can take are 
largely captured in the costs incurred by merchants and overall friction costs. 
 120. P and N are a decomposition of c (care) shown in Figure 1. 
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for a payment card transaction is u, and his or her net value from using 
the payment card network is: 
 𝑢 − 𝐿(𝑃,𝑁) − 𝜙𝑃 − 𝜃𝑁, 
 
under the assumption that the marginal cost of network (𝐿(𝑃,𝑁) +𝜙𝑃 + 𝜃𝑁) is the price paid by the consumer in the form of monetary 
and time costs.121 Rearranging the conditions for optimality (shown in 
the appendix) gives rise to the following expression, which provides 
insight into the substitution between network and POS security 
measures: − 𝐿,𝐿- = 𝜙𝜃. 
 
This equality states that the ratio of the marginal reduction in 
fraud losses from POS and network care is equal to the ratio of each 
method’s marginal cost. This relationship implies that as the relative 
marginal cost of POS verification rises, payment card networks will 
choose greater reliance on network authentication and vice versa. To 
see this, suppose that the marginal cost of POS precaution rises. To 
maintain optimality, LP must also rise. Because of diminishing 
marginal returns to increased precaution, a reduction in the use of POS 
services will lead to an increase in LP, while substitution to network 
care simultaneously will reduce LN until the equality of the ratios is 
reestablished. 
The graphical solution to the joint care problem can be 
represented in two dimensions in Figure 2.122 𝐿0(𝑃, 𝑁) is an iso-loss 
curve, representing the minimum achievable loss.123 Point A, along a 
45° line, represents an equal use of POS and network care. The slopes 
of the tangent lines represent the relative costs of network and POS 
                                                   
 121. Nonsecurity marginal costs are normalized to zero. 
 122. See James Cooper & Todd Zywicki, A Chip Off the Old Block or a New 
Direction for Payment Cards Security? The Chip & Pin Debate, Apple Pay, and the 
Law & Economics of Preventing Payment Card Fraud 19-20 (Geo. Mason U. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 17-09, 2017), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/ 
publications/working_papers/1709.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGK7-37P7]. The three-
dimensional solution is shown in Figure A1 in the appendix. See id. at 49 fig.A1. 
 123. See id at 19. Slopes of isoloss curve come from total differentiation of the 
loss function holding loss constant: 𝐿(𝑃,𝑁),𝑑𝑃 + 𝐿(𝑃,𝑁)-𝑑𝑁 = 0 3(,)3(-) = − 4546. 
In reality, as the relative costs of POS and network change, the level of total loss at 
the new P* and N* will rise unless P and N are perfect substitutes. In this way, Figure 
1 captures the pure substitution effect of changes in relative costs. 
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authentication with the steeper curve representing relatively more 
expensive network costs and the flatter curve representing relatively 
cheaper network costs. The optimal mix of network and POS service 
occurs at the tangency point, which is where the slope of the iso-loss 
line—which represents the technical ability to substitute POS for 
network authentication—equals the ratio of network and POS costs or, 
more technically, where − 4546 = 78. 
 
 
Figure 2. Optimal Mix of POS and Network Care 
 
As one can readily see, the solutions to the cost-minimization 
problem are intuitive: If POS and network costs are equal, then the 
solution is at point A, where the tangent bisects the 45° line, meaning 
that both security measures are used equally.124 Systems with relatively 
higher network costs (point C) rely more on POS authentication and 
vice versa for systems with relatively more expensive POS costs (point 
B). Importantly, not only do higher network costs lead to less reliance 
on network methods of authentication, but they also lead to higher 
overall losses. 
                                                   
 124. See supra fig.2. The equality of use based on equality of marginal costs 
is based on the assumption in the model that each security input has equal marginal 
product. See id. If the marginal products of fraud prevention were different, equal 
marginal costs would not imply equal use. See id. 
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The solution shown in Figure 2 captures only the substitution 
effect from relative price changes. There is also a second-order impact 
on harm: Because the cost of POS services does not fall to compensate 
for higher network costs, the payments system is devoting fewer 
resources overall to fraud prevention, which leads to higher losses. To 
illustrate the full effect of more expensive network care, we conducted 
a simulation by parameterizing the joint-care model to derive 
equilibrium levels of care and fraud. POS costs are held constant at 1 
with network costs ranging from 0.25 to 3. Results are shown in Figure 
3. 
 
Figure 3. Simulation Results 
 
 
When the POS and network costs of care are equal, they are 
employed in equal amounts to combat fraud.125 When the marginal 
cost of network authentication is one-fourth the cost of POS, network 
use is four times that of POS use. As network costs are increased, not 
only is there a marked substitution to POS authentication, but total 
harm also rises because substitution is imperfect. Although the 
payment system can shift from network to POS authentication, the 
marginal POS precautions are not as productive as the lost network 
precautions because of diminishing marginal returns. 
In the next section, we examine the model’s predictive capability 
against the EU and U.S. experiences with payment card security, 
focusing primarily on the recent transition to EMV. In brief, we find 
that this model of payment security is consistent with the way in which 
                                                   
 125. See supra fig.3. This assumes equal marginal products.  
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payment security has developed in the U.S. and around the world.126 
The model explains the peculiar status of the U.S. as a historical outlier 
with respect to payment security and particularly the divergent paths 
in payments taken by Europe (which adopted EMV Chip and PIN 
technology in the early 2000s) and the U.S. (which remained 
standardized on magnetic-stripe technology until 2016 and even then 
adopted a new standard using Chip and Signature technology instead 
of Chip and PIN).127 The analysis suggests that the addition of PIN 
verification in the U.S. may not be consistent with network value 
optimization.  
III. NETWORK COST MINIMIZATION AND EMV ADOPTION IN THE US 
In this Section, we use the model presented in Part II to help 
explain the timing and method of adoption of the EMV liability shift 
standard in the U.S. as well as to analyze the debate over the use of 
PINs to authenticate transactions. First, we examine the historical role 
that telecommunications costs have played in determining different 
mixes of POS and network security measures. Next, we examine the 
underlying forces that have led the U.S. to follow the EU in adopting 
the EMV standard, which puts a greater reliance on POS security. We 
also use our joint-precautions model to suggest an explanation for the 
fact that the networks did not mandate EMV but rather have created 
incentives for merchants and issuers to adopt EMV technology by 
shifting the liability for fraudulent transactions. Finally, we examine 
the case for requiring PINs as an additional method of POS 
authentication, and we find reasons to suggest that this requirement 
may not hold up to a benefit-cost analysis. 
A. The Role of Telecommunications Costs 
In recent years, the payment security debate has focused in large 
part on the extent of the security devices built into cards (chips) and 
the verification method required by consumers and merchants (PINs, 
signatures, some other form of verification, or none at all).128 
Ironically, however, the friction and cost of these forms of POS 
security have not been the determining factor as to whether they are 
required.129 Instead, the degree of security and verification required by 
                                                   
 126. See infra Section III.A. 
 127. See infra Section III.A. 
 128. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 4, at 11 (2016). 
 129. See Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud 
Liability Rules, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 28-29 (2010). 
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consumers and merchants has been an indirect manifestation of a more 
fundamental factor—the speed and cost of a country’s 
telecommunications technology.130 
Authentication of payment card transactions can take place in 
two distinct frameworks: online and offline. In an online system, 
payment card authorization takes place online and in real time.131 
Essentially, once a consumer swipes or dips a card, the information on 
the stripe or chip is transmitted from the payment card terminal to the 
issuing bank.132 The issuer applies a set of highly complex computer 
algorithms and accesses information about the consumer’s unique 
account—for instance, by validating the cryptogram (in the case of a 
chip card) and by determining (a) whether the transaction would 
exceed the consumer’s authorized credit limit, (b) whether the card 
has been reported lost or stolen, or (c) whether the transaction appears 
odd in relation to normal consumer habits—to either authorize or 
reject the payment.133 Over time, of course, telecommunications have 
become speedier, more reliable, and less expensive, enabling 
authorization to be made even faster.134 The transaction is approved or 
rejected within seconds.135 
In an offline system, by contrast, final authorization from the 
issuer does not take place in real time.136 Instead, the transaction is 
made and held by the merchant—perhaps for days—and is later 
“batched” and sent for approval.137 In this sense, an offline system 
resembles the credit card imprinters of earlier eras when the merchant 
made an imprint of the consumer’s credit card and then submitted it to 
the financial institution for clearing.138 
                                                   
 130. See Odysseas Papadimitriou, How Credit Card Transaction Processing 
Works: Steps, Fees & Participants, WALLETHUB (Apr. 2, 2009),  
https://wallethub.com/edu/credit-card-transaction/25511/ [https://perma.cc/KTX2-
8N4X]. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. The transmission goes through several stages, such as the acquirer 
and the card network, to reach the issuer. See id.  
 133. See id. 
 134. See Sienna Kossman, 8 FAQs About EMV Credit Cards, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-
news/emv-faq-chip-cards-answers-1264.php [https://perma.cc/68XQ-WNMG]. 
 135. See Papadimitriou, supra note 130. 
 136. See Yamarie Grullon, No Easy Answers: Offline Credit Card Processing, 
SHOPKEEP (May 30, 2018), https://www.shopkeep.com/blog/no-easy-answers-
accepting-credit-cards-offline#step-1 [https://perma.cc/XJN6-3GN9]. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See, e.g., Credit Card Activities Manual Glossary, FDIC, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/credit_card/glossary.html 
[https://perma.cc/MT6W-GPTX] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (discussing credit card 
imprinting under “Paper-Based Transaction”). 
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Traditionally, the determining factor for whether a country’s 
consumer payment card system standardized on online or offline 
authorization was the cost and reliability of the country’s 
telecommunications system.139 In particular, countries where 
telecommunications technology has been fast, reliable, and 
inexpensive have been late adopters of higher-cost cards and increased 
POS verification methods by consumers and merchants.140 In countries 
where telecommunications technology has been slow, unreliable, and 
expensive, consumers and merchants traditionally have had a greater 
responsibility and a greater cost for preventing fraud.141 In other words, 
countries where low-cost telecommunications have enabled card 
issuers and networks to prevent fraud at a comparatively lower cost 
have been able to avoid requiring cards with more secure technologies 
built in (such as chips) and the increased payment friction that 
accompanies such methods.142  
This technologically motivated decision explains the variation 
among countries in their migration toward EMV systems.143 Consider 
the vast differences between EU and U.S. telecommunications costs. 
In 2000, the cost of a ten-minute local call was five times more 
expensive in major EU countries than in the U.S., and the cost of the 
same long-distance call was between two and three times more 
expensive.144 As the model would predict, while 99% of U.S. 
transactions were authenticated online in real time, only 25–40% of 
EU transactions were authenticated online.145 The absence of real time 
                                                   
 139. See generally JULIE CONROY, EMV: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE U.S. 
OUTLOOK (2014), https://aitegroup.com/report/emv-lessons-learned-and-us-outlook 
[https://perma.cc/925D-7ZKH]. Ronald Mann has also noted that countries with 
relatively more expensive telecommunications costs should be predicted to have 
higher fraud rates ceteris paribus, although he does not discuss the joint care model 
we discuss here or the use of alternative authorization technologies. See Ronald J. 
Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1055, 1069 (2002). 
 140. See Mann, supra note 139, at 1069-70. 
 141. See id. at 1070. 
 142. See id. at 1069. 
 143. See id. at 1070. 
 144. The prices for (local, long-distance) in 2004 Euros: U.S. (€0.09, €0.43); 
Germany (€0.43, €1.24); France (€0.42, €1.19); UK (€0.47, €0.95).  See Eurostat, 
Price of Fixed Telecomunnications, 2000-2010 (1) (EUR per 10-minute Call), 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File: 
Price_of_fixed_telecommunications,_2000–10_(1)_(EUR_per_10-
minute_call)_YB14.png [https://perma.cc/8FGG-EXMW]. 
 145. See Tracy Kitten, The History of EMV: An EMV Forefather Explains Why 
Chip is the Future, BANK INFO SECURITY (Jan. 11, 2011), 
https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/history-emv-i-933 
[https://perma.cc/Z6TR-HKFW]. 
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online verification in Europe made it essential to strengthen 
verification procedures at the time of purchase.146 Because the 
payment might not be authorized or rejected for hours or even days, 
merchants and financial institutions needed some alternative system 
to reduce fraud at the time of purchase.147 As a former European 
MasterCard executive explained, key in designing the EMV standard 
to be introduced in the EU was the need “to continue to allow the off-
lying authorization or approval of credit cards in an environment 
where telecommunication costs were rather expensive and people 
were talking about 30 or 40 cents per call to authorize a credit-card 
transaction.”148 The goal was to reduce fraud but “stay down in the 25 
to 40 percent [online authorization] rate that they were used to in the 
European market.”149 Evidencing the substitution between POS and 
network authentication, the MasterCard executive noted that, after 
France completed its migration to the EMV standard, it had reduced 
its online authorization from close to 40% to about 10%.150 
As a result, they developed the concept of Chip and PIN as a 
substitute for real-time authorization.151 Note that at that time, online 
authorization (with magnetic-stripe cards) was the preferred 
authorization method because of the low cost and high convenience of 
real-time authorization.152 In offline-authorization countries, however, 
eventually it was thought that, although Chip and PIN was more 
expensive and less convenient, the additional expense was justified in 
light of the difficulty of preventing fraud in other ways.153 
Consistent with the joint-precautions model’s predictions, the 
burden on consumers and merchants for security at the POS, therefore, 
historically has been a negative function of the degree to which the 
networks and issuers themselves can engage in timely and accurate 
verification of payments.154 As will be discussed, the recent adoption 
of chip technology in the U.S. in its particular form (i.e., without 
required PIN) reflects the economic tradeoffs embedded in this 
underlying economic model.155 
                                                   
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. (stating how the need for offline authentication drove the 
development of EMC). 
 149. See id. (clarifying that the goal was to decrease fraud without increasing 
online verification). 
 150. Id.  
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
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B. Explaining Timing and Method of EMV Adoption in the U.S. 
The model predicts that fraud losses will rise as the cost of 
security rises. Accordingly, we should expect jurisdictions with high 
telecommunications costs to have higher fraud rates than those in the 
U.S. and other jurisdictions with low telecommunications costs.156 The 
data tend to support this prediction.157 
For example, at the time that EMV was adopted in the United 
Kingdom (UK), the fraud rate in that country was fourteen basis 
points—almost three times higher than the fraud rate in the U.S. at the 
time (just five basis points).158 As noted earlier, telecommunications 
costs in the UK were very high at that time; therefore, the country used 
offline authorization.159 In the short run, the UK’s adoption of EMV 
had the desired effect of reducing POS fraud.160 For example, losses 
from counterfeit fraud dropped from £129.7 million in 2004 
(immediately before the country’s liability shift) to £43.4 million in 
2013.161 Losses from lost or stolen fraud fell from £114.4 million in 
2004 to £58.9 million in 2013.162 
On the other hand, fraud rates in the U.S. have been relatively 
low because of the sophistication of data analysis by processing 
networks and the availability of real-time online transaction 
authentication.163 Between 2011 and 2013, however, U.S. credit card 
fraud losses increased by 31%.164 This increase primarily was driven 
by counterfeit fraud, which increased from $1.652 billion to $2.41 
billion in 2013.165 Ironically, another factor in the increase in U.S. 
fraud was the introduction of EMV verification in Europe and other 
parts of the world, which pushed criminal activity involving 
counterfeit cards to the U.S.166 
The increase in fraud was not lost on consumers, who have 
expressed concern regarding security in the wake the high-profile data 
                                                   
 156. See CONROY, supra note 139, at 8. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. at 9. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 28. 
 164. Id. Lost or stolen fraud, by contrast, was less than half the size of 
counterfeit fraud in 2011 ($811 million), had increased to only $825 million in 2013, 
and was projected to rise to only $850 million in 2015. Id. Unlike counterfeit fraud, 
lost or stolen fraud is not easily scalable by criminals. See id. at 9. 
 165. See id.  
 166. See id. at 5.  
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breaches.167 According to one consumer survey, 90% of consumers 
were aware of the data breaches at major retailers and 93% were 
concerned about the security of their credit card information.168 
Another survey found that 77% of consumers were anxious about their 
financial information and social security numbers being stolen or 
compromised.169 Industry surveys of consumers also found some 
significant support for the adoption of EMV cards.170 The primary 
reason consumers stated for wanting EMV cards was the increased 
security that those cards provide.171 
This rapid increase in fraud, with its attendant consumer 
reaction, was a primary impetus for the U.S. adoption of EMV.172 
Again, this pattern is consistent with the model predicting that 
exogenous shocks to expected harm—such as increases in fraudsters’ 
technological capabilities—would lead to improvements to security. 
Moreover, to the extent that the marginal product of POS precautions 
is likely to be larger than that for network precautions—for example, 
in preventing the interception of credit card data at the POS or 
preventing the ability to use counterfeit cards—the increase in 
precautions primarily will be along the POS dimension.173 
                                                   
 167. See Claire Greene & Joanna Stavins, Did the Target Data Breach Change 
Consumer Assessments of Payment Card Security?, FED. RES. BANK BOS. 1, 4 (Aug. 
2016), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/researchdatareport/pdf/ 
rdr1601.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8NM-CPSE] (finding that consumers expressed less 
confidence in their data security after the Target breach). 
 168. David Braue, Consumers More Concerned About Credit-Card Security 
Than Their Health, CSO, http://www.cso.com.au/article/558332/consumers-more-
concerned-about-credit-card-security-than-their-health/ [https://perma.cc/GA88-
64ZD] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 169. See MasterCard Survey Reveals Americans Anxious About Personal 
Security but Optimistic About New Ways to Pay, MASTERCARD (July 9, 2015), 
http://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/mastercard-survey-reveals-
americans-anxious-about-personal-security-but-optimistic-about-new-ways-to-pay/ 
[https://perma.cc/J5B7-29C3] (noting 55% of respondents to the survey “would rather 
have naked pictures of themselves leaked online than have their financial information 
stolen”). 
 170. See generally Consumer Enthusiasm and Desire for Chip Cards 
Growing, MASTERCARD (2015), http://docplayer.net/12793239-Consumer-
enthusiasm-and-desire-for-chip-cards-growing.html [https://perma.cc/9SX2-FKS9]. 
 171. See id. at 2. 
 172. See CONROY, supra note 139, at 5. 
 173. See infra CONCLUSION & APPENDIX. In the context of our model, this will 
occur as long as LP is sufficiently larger than LN, which would be the case if a system 
were using a large level of network security in relation to POS security. 
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An interesting facet of the U.S. movement to EMV was that it 
was accomplished not only without any government involvement,174 
but also without being privately mandated. Before EMV, the status 
quo provided that as long as merchants abided by contractually 
obligated security measures, issuers would be liable for counterfeit 
and lost or stolen fraud.175 This rule was akin to a strict liability rule 
on issuers. In a bilateral care context, strict liability is known to create 
a moral hazard on the part of the non-liable party.176 However, if POS 
measures were unlikely to contribute much to security or were too 
expensive to be cost justified, a strict-liability rule would be superior 
to others because it would economize on administration costs.177 
Further, contractual obligations for network memberships could be 
used to mitigate moral hazard through direct regulation of behavior.178 
Rather than requiring merchants to adopt the EMV standard as a 
condition for network membership, the major networks moved to what 
can best be described as a rule of strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence:179 The issuers remain strictly liable for 
counterfeit fraud unless the merchant has failed to adopt the EMV 
standard.180 In the standard joint-precautions tort model, it is well 
                                                   
 174. See Jessica Thrasher, The Unintented Consequences of Industry 
Mandates: How EMV is Changing the U.S Payments Landscape 13 (Aug. 2018) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University). 
 175. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
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known that this rule will lead each party to adopt optimal care.181 The 
victim will choose to take due care because otherwise he or she will 
be stuck with the full costs of accidents, which are less than the cost 
of optimal care.182 Knowing that the victim will never be contributorily 
negligent, the injurer internalizes all the accident and avoidance costs 
and therefore has an incentive to take optimal care.183 
The liability-shift solution to the EMV migration highlights the 
decentralized nature of the optimal-care problem. Although our model 
couches this as a joint-care problem with a uniform optimal POS 
solution, the reality is that it may not be optimal for every merchant to 
adopt EMV when expected damages are heterogeneous.184 In this 
manner, a uniform EMV mandate would force small merchants facing 
minimal risks from counterfeit fraud to engage in care that would not 
be cost justified. The liability-shift rule, then, could be thought of as 
an efficient way to use the decentralized nature of the POS-care 
                                                   
party who took the least precaution. See U.S. PAYMENTS FORUM, UNDERSTANDING THE 
U.S. EMV LIABILITY SHIFTS 5 (2017), http://www.uspaymentsforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/EMV-Fraud-Liability-Shift-WP-FINAL-July-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P97V-JC3L]. For example, if a merchant is EMV compliant but a 
customer’s bank has yet to issue EMV-compliant cards, losses from data stolen from 
this card would be the issuer’s responsibility. See id. (stating that if a consumer’s bank 
has no issued EMV compliant cards but the merchant is EMV-compliant, the issuer 
is liable).  
 181. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1668 (A.J Auerbach & M. Feldstein, eds., 2002); 
see generally Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Markets, Torts, and 
Social Inefficiency, 37 RAND J. ECON. 300 (2006). 
 182. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 181, at 1669. 
 183. See id. at 1669-70. 
 184. Formally, suppose that the amount of fraud damages that a merchant 
faces is represented by a parameter δ, which is distributed f(δ). The optimal level of 
POS care for each merchant, 𝑃9∗(𝛿), will be a positive function of expected damages. 
This can be seen from the individual merchant’s loss maximization problem, in which 
the merchant selects P taking N as a given: max 𝑞9[𝑢9 − 𝐿(𝑃9; 𝑁) − 𝜙𝑃9]. Assuming 
that 𝛿 is a scaling factor for L, differentiating the first-order conditions with respect 
to 𝛿 yields: ?,@∗?A = B4C455 > 0. Comparing this result with expression A9 in the appendix, 
which does not hold N constant and depends on the substitutability of network for 
POS care in light of changed damages, highlights the divergent incentives of network 
managers and individual merchants. Even though a uniform EMV mandate (P*(𝛿̅)) 
may be optimal if one rule has to be applied to the entire population, those suffering 
harm away from the average (𝛿̅) are forced to take too much or too little care. Consider 
the small merchant who is unlikely to be a victim of counterfeit fraud located at 𝛿F < 𝛿̅ . This merchant will be better off if she is able to opt out of EMV as long as expected 
liability from fraud damages without EMV is less than the increase in precaution costs 
associated with adopting EMV, which is more likely to hold at lower levels of 
expected harm: 𝐿G𝑃∗(𝛿F)H < 𝜙[𝑃∗G𝛿̅H − 𝑃∗G𝛿FH]. See generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL, 
supra note 181. 
 A Chip Off the Old Block 905 
decisions to harness private information about damages. Small 
merchants who view their risk of being targeted by fraudsters for data 
theft as small and who also view the potential losses from customers 
using counterfeit cards as small rationally may decide to forgo EMV 
adoption because the marginal benefits are less than the marginal costs 
of precaution. Importantly, this reticence to adopt EMV is optimal 
from a network point of view as well. If those merchants were forced 
to adopt EMV, the higher costs would be passed along to consumers 
without sufficient offsetting benefits in terms of reduced risk of 
payment card fraud. 
By allowing self-selection, this approach has an added dynamic 
benefit. Today, the largest underpenetrated market in the U.S. for 
acceptance of payment cards is these very small businesses.185 It is 
estimated that some twenty million small businesses today that do not 
accept payment cards could convert a mobile phone or tablet into a 
card reader or cloud-based payment device using a payment dongle 
such as Square.186 Not only does the inability to accept payment cards 
increase payment friction for both consumers and these businesses, 
but it is also a primary source of tax evasion because cash transactions 
are largely untraceable. Thus, to the extent that certain elements of 
payment security increase the cost to particular merchants (such as 
small merchants) of accepting cards, that expense can deter the general 
spread of electronic payments in the economy. As analysts at J.P. 
Morgan observed: 
In other words, mobile phone and tablet card readers could do to the 
physical world what PayPal did to the online space over 15 years ago, by 
[providing] casual merchants that previously couldn’t afford to maintain a 
merchant account with a cost effective means of taking credit or debit 
cards.187 
A potential concern about employing EMV through a liability 
shift could be moral hazard on the part of issuers; if issuers perceive 
that merchants are unlikely to adopt EMV, then issuers will no longer 
be liable for losses and hence will have suboptimal incentives to take 
precautions (e.g., invest in fewer network-based tools or solutions). 
There are at least two reasons, however, to believe that moral hazard 
will be muted. First, cards are issued to customers to be used at myriad 
merchants. As long as merchants who view EMV adoption as an 
uneconomical proposition represent a relatively small proportion of 
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charges made by issuers’ customers (which is likely to be the case), 
issuer incentives will remain essentially unchanged. Second, because 
the level of network care influences POS care, sufficiently low levels 
of issuer care may increase risks to a point that causes merchants to 
adopt EMV, which would shift liability back to issuers. 
 
IV. CUSTOMER VERIFICATION AND EMV: 
PIN, SIGNATURE, OR . . . NOTHING? 
The introduction of EMV into the U.S. has been contentious, in 
large part because of the costs of implementation (which, as discussed 
earlier, are substantial).188 Another major debate accompanying the 
EMV transaction is the appropriate CVM. When EMV was originally 
introduced, the system retained the traditional signature requirement 
as an acceptable form of CVM, with no CVM for transactions below 
certain thresholds or where the risk of fraud was likely to be low.189 By 
2018, however, card networks announced plans to eliminate even a 
signature CVM for most transactions, in order to reduce the friction 
associated with card payments and because signatures provided little 
additional verification.190 At the time of the announcement in 
December 2017, Visa estimated that more than three-fourths of its 
POS transactions already did not require a signature, with no 
noticeable increase in fraud costs.191 Moreover, rapid technological 
innovation and the adoption of protections such as tokenization, multi-
factor identification, and biometrics are making possible greater 
security at lower costs than the traditional signature requirement.192 
Some, however, have argued that PIN should be the required 
CVM. For example, federal lawmakers have held hearings on the 
matter, and bills about requiring PINs have been introduced at the state 
level.193 As noted, several state democratic attorneys general co-signed 
a letter to the major payment card networks and issuers asking that 
they adopt PIN as the required CVM instead of signature, and several 
merchant class actions have been filed that ask courts to impose PIN 
as the required CVM.194 Furthermore, although many small businesses 
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have complained about the cost of EMV, many big-box retailers and 
other special interests have argued that PINs should be adopted.195 In 
this Section, we examine the net worth of PIN verification from the 
point of view of maximizing network value, and we also explore the 
political economy of the PIN debate. Applying the foregoing model of 
the evolution of payment card security to the specifics of the Chip and 
PIN debate suggests that there is no evidence that the decision of card 
networks and issuers to provide a liability shift with respect to EMV 
adoption—but not to require PIN verification—reflects a market 
failure. Instead, as the foregoing analysis has suggested, the decision 
to incentivize EMV adoption but not PIN verification appears to be 
consistent with a desire to maximize the overall value of the system to 
all parties, taking into account the costs and benefits of greater security 
as well as the costs of alternative security precautions. Moreover, the 
dynamic nature of evolving payment security protocols with respect 
to consumer payments suggests that government should take great 
caution before second guessing these decisions.196 
A. Does PIN Increase the Value of the Network? 
As shown in Part II, even if consumers are not financially 
responsible for losses from fraud, they end up paying for fraud and 
prevention costs indirectly through fees and transaction costs. 
Accordingly, consumers have an interest in the adoption of only those 
additional security measures that have a marginal value beyond their 
marginal cost. 
Figure 4 puts the question of PIN adoption in the framework of 
the joint-care model, showing the curve representing the sum of fraud 
and precaution costs (TC) as a function of only POS care.197 The 
question is whether the status quo—EMV without PIN verification—
is more like point A (where the marginal cost of care is less than the 
marginal benefit of additional precaution) or point B (the level of 
optimal care). If EMV alone gets us to point A, then adoption of PIN 
verification may move us closer to the optimal level because the 
additional friction introduced by PIN verification is less than the 
marginal benefit in terms of reduced expected fraud losses. On the 
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other hand, if the status quo is closer to point B, the optimal level of 
care, PIN adoption will result in too much care. Although using PINs 
will provide additional protection against fraud, this marginal benefit 
will be too small in relation to its marginal cost to be beneficial to 
society, moving us toward point C. We next explore the available 
evidence, which in our view suggests that although PIN may provide 
some temporary relief from lost or stolen fraud, this marginal benefit 
is likely to be meager in relation to its substantial marginal costs. 
 
Figure 4. Marginal Costs and Benefits from PIN 
 
1. Marginal Benefits 
As previously discussed, the push to implement EMV in the U.S. 
was animated by the rising rate of fraud, particularly counterfeit 
fraud.198 That rapid increase in counterfeit fraud explains the move to 
adopt EMV in the U.S., notwithstanding its additional cost and 
payment friction. The introduction of EMV in the UK, for example, 
cut counterfeit fraud losses in that country to less than one-third of 
their prior rate—from £170 million in 2008 to £43 million in 2015.199 
It is expected that once EMV is implemented in the U.S., counterfeit 
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fraud should drop dramatically there as well.200 Thus, implementing 
EMV alone addresses the largest source of preventable fraud. 
Moreover, adopting EMV appears to be having the intended effect 
already; according to MasterCard, merchants who have adopted EMV 
technology have seen a 54% year-over-year reduction in fraud in the 
first year.201 Further, Visa reports that counterfeit transactions fell by 
66% from June 2015 to June 2017 for EMV-compliant merchants.202 
EMV alone, however, provides little protection against lost or 
stolen fraud. A valid (not counterfeit) card in the hands of an 
unauthorized user will work until it is reported lost or stolen or until 
purchasing patterns result in the card being flagged as such. Although 
EMV, as implemented in the U.S., allows signature verification as the 
preferred method, a signature can be easily faked and is rarely 
checked. Further, many transactions do not require a signature or other 
CVM. The addition of a PIN works primarily on this margin. PIN 
verification adds a layer of security against lost or stolen fraud because 
a lost or stolen card is worthless without the PIN. Indeed, the 
experience in the UK illustrates this observation: After the 
introduction of Chip and PIN, lost or stolen losses fell from £68.5 
million in 2006 to £44.4 million by 2010.203 Although some of this 
decline may have been associated with the overall reduction in 
economic activity during the financial crisis, the use of PINs appears 
to have had an effect. 
Despite its potential to ameliorate some fraud, the overall impact 
from the addition of PIN to EMV cards is likely to be small; Aite 
Group estimates that only about 2% to 2.5% of fraud would be 
prevented by adding the PIN verification method to EMV.204 There are 
at least three factors behind this small marginal benefit.  
First, criminals adapt. For example, the initial decrease in lost or 
stolen fraud after the introduction of PIN security in the UK was short 
lived. Lost or stolen fraud began a dramatic reversal, reaching £74.1 
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million by 2015, higher than before Chip and PIN was introduced.205 
This reversal in lost or stolen fraud suggests that criminals sought new 
tactics as counterfeiting became more difficult: They focused on new 
ways of capturing both the card and the consumer’s PIN.  For example, 
thieves use such methods as false keypads that overlay the POS 
checkout and capture consumer PINs, installation of small cameras 
focused on a store’s keypad, and even old-fashioned techniques such 
as looking over a consumer’s shoulder as he or she enters a PIN.206 
Similar techniques have been used to capture consumer PINs from 
ATM transactions.207 Phishing scams also become more profitable if 
consumers can be tricked into providing their PINs. According to 
Financial Fraud Action UK, ATM attacks in the UK increased from 
2,553 in the first four months of 2012 to 7,525 during a similar period 
in 2013.208  
Second, consumers who have their PINs captured in addition to 
their card numbers can suffer much greater loss than those who merely 
have their magnetic stripe compromised. In particular, not only can a 
criminal who captures a consumer’s PIN engage in fraudulent 
transactions, if it is a debit card, he or she can also go to an ATM and 
empty a consumer’s bank account. According to data collected by the 
Federal Reserve, the average loss per fraudulent transaction is 
approximately twice as large for PIN debit fraud as for signature 
debit.209 Moreover, many consumers reuse their PINs for multiple 
purposes to reduce the risk of forgetting them; thus, a consumer whose 
PIN is breached for one card may suffer other losses. So even though 
a PIN might provide a consumer with increased marginal protection 
from fraud—in this case only lost or stolen fraud because it is the 
EMV chip that prevents counterfeit fraud—this additional reduction 
in risk must be tempered by the cost of risking higher loss in the event 
of a breach or skimming of the consumer’s PIN. 
Third, in addition to any change in criminal behavior, the fact 
remains that PINs will only help mitigate lost or stolen fraud, which 
remains the smallest portion of payment card fraud—about 9%.210 
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What’s more, a PIN will protect only cards that are not subject to 
online authorization, or that have not been reported lost or stolen, or 
whose use is sufficiently normal to avoid network algorithmic 
protections, because these cards will be rejected during the online 
authorization process. As noted, the largest component of fraud has 
been counterfeit cards, which EMV alone addresses; PINs offer no 
marginal benefit. And the most rapidly growing component of fraud 
is CNP fraud, which does not require a PIN.211 In the UK, between 
2004 and 2008 CNP fraud increased from £151 million annually to 
£328 million annually.212 British issuers and merchants responded to 
this skyrocketing fraud by increasing protections for CNP.213 That step 
led to a decline in CNP fraud to £221 million annually in 2011.214 By 
2013, however, this trend had reversed itself, and CNP fraud had 
increased to £301 million.215 Another avenue of fraud that a PIN will 
not impact is “application fraud,” which occurs when a criminal 
submits an application for a new card in the victim’s name.216 In 
Australia, for example, from 2011 to 2012 fraudulent application fraud 
rose threefold as the adoption of chip and PIN accelerated.217 
2. Marginal Costs 
Although layering PIN verification onto an EMV card is likely 
to provide some additional protection against lost or stolen fraud, it 
also will add substantial new friction to the consumer payment 
system.218 First, and perhaps foremost, adding new terminals will 
increase implementation and certification time.219 Installing those 
terminals will also increase transaction time.220 For example, if a 
merchant sought not only to process EMV transactions but also to 
require a PIN, that would require still further security and other 
costs.221 For many small merchants, it is not uncommon to keep a small 
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payment-processing terminal behind the sales counter and to 
physically swipe or dip the card for the consumer.222 If merchants were 
forced to accept chip and PIN verification, by contrast, the merchant 
would be required to (a) place the card terminal in a location that is 
easily accessible to consumers and (b) take proper precautions so that 
consumers can shield the keypad when entering their PIN to prevent 
unauthorized surveillance of that process.223 Sit-down restaurants 
would need one or more portable payment terminals for consumers to 
use which in turn would raise new security issues as well as the 
potential for damage to payment terminals. According to one survey, 
in June 2016 only 39% of “eating and drinking” establishments had 
PIN capability.224 Furthermore, certain types of CVMs may be 
excessively inconvenient, cumbersome, or even infeasible in many 
transaction contexts, such as trying to enter a PIN when paying at a 
fast-food drive-through window or paying a toll on the highway.225 
Along with adding time and inconvenience to the transaction, PIN 
verification also increases the likelihood of a “false rejection” that 
occurs when a legitimate user forgets his or her PIN.226 
The ambivalence about PIN verification is reflected in consumer 
surveys. For example, in a survey of debit customers conducted in 
May 2016 by Visa, about half (47%) of Visa debit cardholders 
expressed concern about using their PIN to make debit card purchases, 
with 24% of respondents saying that they “don’t think it is safe to use 
[their] PIN,” 9% saying “it takes longer,” and 8% saying that they 
“don’t always remember their PIN.”227 Indeed, consumer experience 
with the choice between using signature debit or PIN debit shows a 
revealed aversion to PINs. 228 In the U.S., consumers have traditionally 
preferred signature debit over PIN debit.229 For example, in 2014, 65% 
of debit transactions were made with signature debit, compared with 
only 35% for PIN debit.230 Many consumers who could use PIN debit 
obviously prefer to use signature debit. 
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Further, according to a report by the Aite Group, one unnamed 
“sizable” U.S. card issuer initiated its migration with chip and PIN as 
its preferred CVM for credit cards.231 The results of the experiment 
were revealing about consumer willingness to incur higher costs and 
friction in exchange for PIN verification:  
[The issuer] only deployed EMV credit cards to a sample population to test 
the impact of the more cumbersome CVM. This issuer experienced an 8% 
drop in transaction volume among the pilot portfolio and is now working on 
a plan to transition to chip and signature for its credit card CVM. 
In other words, if consumers valued the added security of PIN 
verification, they should have used the issuer’s card more. Instead, the 
increased cost of using a PIN card caused consumers to push the PIN-
based card to the back of their wallets in favor of other cards that 
lacked PIN functionality but that consumers evidently found easier to 
use, regardless of what they said they preferred. 
In addition to the per-transaction marginal costs that a PIN 
regime would introduce, transitioning to PINs would cause large fixed 
expenditures that likely would be passed on to consumers. According 
to Aite’s estimates, it would cost approximately $3.1 billion to enable 
all non-PIN-accepting merchants (such as small merchants who lack 
PIN-capable devices) to accept PIN verification.232 This figure 
excludes the cost for sit-down restaurants to purchase pay-at-table 
terminals (which cost about $500 each, amounting to about $665 
million in aggregate).233 Merchants who currently accept PIN 
verification (for PIN debit cards) would spend approximately $380 
million to upgrade.234 Finally, staff training time would likely cost 
about $389 million.235 Overall, Aite estimated that it would cost 
merchants $4.53 billion to transition to Chip and PIN.236 
Mandating Chip and PIN technology also can be cumbersome 
for very small merchants who use small, convenient, and simple 
portable card-processing devices.237 Payment dongles such as Square 
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allow very small merchants—such as landscapers, handymen, or 
farmer’s market vendors—to accept card payments by affixing a small 
payment device to their smartphone or tablet. Those small devices 
enable merchants to quickly accept payment cards without the cost 
and inconvenience of a large, PIN-enabled payment machine. Newer 
dongle models that can accept EMV cards are larger and more 
expensive than traditional magnetic-stripe receivers, and adding a 
secure PIN pad would dramatically increase their cost still more and 
reduce their convenience. In particular, not only must equipment have 
a PIN pad available, but it must also contain the software to encrypt 
or tokenize the consumer’s PIN.238 
What’s more, Aite Group estimates that it would also cost card 
issuers more than $2.6 billion to transition to universal PIN use.239 That 
figure includes the various costs and difficulties related to providing 
consumers with an initial, temporary PIN that consumers would then 
be able to reset.240 Overall, the Aite Group estimates that the total 
direct cost to issuers and merchants of adopting Chip and PIN would 
exceed $7 billion.241 Moreover, that figure excludes any costs from lost 
sales from payments failures. It also excludes the opportunity cost of 
slowing many small merchants from adopting technologies (such as 
Square) that would permit them to accept payment cards (because of 
the higher cost and size of PIN-enabled devices). 
There are also potential dynamic and second-order costs 
associated with a PIN mandate. Issuers and networks are rapidly 
developing more secure and less expensive CVM methods that can 
improve security without the additional friction of PIN verification or 
other similarly high-friction technologies.242 For example, new 
methods of customer verification are being developed, including 
biometrics (fingerprint or retina scans), voice recognition, and device 
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identification with smartphones (for example, verifying the presence 
of the consumer by geolocating his or her smartphone). 243  
A PIN is often referred to as a static anti-fraud technology 
because once consumers establish a PIN, they rarely change that PIN 
and they frequently reuse it for multiple cards and across multiple 
platforms. In this sense, one can draw an analogy between a static 
transaction-and-authentication technology such as Chip and PIN and 
the infamous Maginot Line that France built and relied on following 
World War I. The Maginot Line was built to repulse German hostility 
through what was thought to be the most likely direction of a German 
attack—head on. That direction was chosen because it was generally 
believed that the German army would not be able to penetrate the 
Ardennes forest. The French military’s reliance on an expensive static 
defense technology turned out to be tragically shortsighted in the face 
of a dynamic threat. Instead of relying solely on chip and PIN (the card 
industry’s figurative Maginot Line), card-processing networks are 
investing major resources in biometrics and other forms of 
authentication such as fingerprint, retina, and voice scanners.244 The 
card networks have introduced technology that uses a consumer’s cell 
phone to help authenticate a card transaction. In short, this service 
provides information about whether a cardholder’s cell phone is 
located near the merchant.245 For example, a transaction in a foreign 
country—which might otherwise be flagged as potentially 
fraudulent—could be authenticated through cell phone geolocation.246 
Variety and experimentation in authentication measures provide 
for innovation—increased security at lower transactional friction—
but constant experimentation also prevents the Maginot Line problem 
by reducing the ability for criminals to target one particular, static 
technology over time. In response to consumer frustration about the 
perceived slow nature and inconvenience of dipping an EMV card, 
financial institutions are already rolling out new cards that combine 
EMV technology with near-field communication (NFC).247 In January 
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2017, TCF Financial Corporation announced that it is adding NFC to 
all of its newly issued EMV cards to increase convenience and to 
speed checkout.248 Citigroup is also equipping all of its new cobranded 
Costco Visa credit cards with NFC, and other issuers are following 
suit.249 In many areas outside the U.S., contactless EMV cards “are 
increasingly becoming the norm.”250 Use of such cards is expected to 
grow rapidly in the U.S., further obviating the relevance of a 
traditional PIN authentication procedure. 
Still more dramatic are payment technologies that do not require 
a physical card. Most notable, of course, is the booming popularity of 
near-field, contactless payment services such as Apple Pay.251 These 
services enable customers to make purchases with high security, 
without a physical card, and with minimal friction.252 With respect to 
Apple Pay, the magnetic-stripe information never comes in contact 
with the merchant’s terminal, and consumers need not run the risk 
associated with inputting one’s PIN.253 Indeed, technologies are being 
developed today that would eliminate any physical card or device 
presence, such as fingerprints, retina scans, or payments by “selfie.” 
The rapid adoption of contactless payment technologies as a 
replacement for traditional plastic cards casts further doubt on the 
wisdom of imposing expensive new mandates on what increasingly 
appears to be obsolescing and transitional technology. 
At a still higher level, issuers and payment networks are creating 
ever-more-sophisticated and accurate authentication algorithms to 
verify transactions. In this sense, the traditional distinction between 
processing and authentication is increasingly being erased. In the 
world of big data, every transaction presented for processing also 
feeds new information into the database that processors and issuers 
use to analyze transactions and develop better models. The major 
processing networks and issuers are always working to develop better 
models of fraud prevention and protections for consumers. 
Increasingly, processing is authentication. 
In light of the preceding discussion, there is little reason to 
believe that the decision not to mandate PIN as a required CVM is the 
result of a market failure or monopoly power. Instead, the decision not 
to mandate PIN reflects the estimate that the marginal benefit from the 
additional security of PIN authentication at the POS is just too small 
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to justify its marginal cost. All told, although Chip and PIN can be a 
valuable measure in fighting lost or stolen fraud, the marginal value 
overall is limited once other precautions (such as EMV) are adopted. 
As industry analysts Thad Peterson and Julie Conroy of Aite Group 
observe, “[S]ince implementation of EMV without any CVM 
dramatically reduces the incidence of counterfeit card risk, and since 
lost/stolen card risk accounts for approximately 9% of fraud losses in 
payment cards, the relative negative impact of implementing EMV 
without PIN was low.”254 Therefore, although using PINs likely will 
reduce lost or stolen fraud, these small—and potentially transitory—
gains are likely to be small in relation to the friction from longer 
checkout times, forgotten PINs, and reduced innovation around 
payment card security.  
 
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PIN DEBATE:  
THE DURBIN AMENDMENT AND INTERCHANGE FEES 
 
The foregoing analysis provides little reason to believe that 
adding PINs to EMV cards is likely to pass a benefit-cost test. PIN 
verification likely will be a passing technology with rapidly declining 
relevance to the world of electronic payments, and at best, most 
consumers are ambivalent toward a PIN mandate. Yet some merchants 
have run to the courthouses and legislatures in attempts to force the 
adoption of PIN verification. As we explain below, these battles over 
PIN verification appear to be merely the latest front in the ongoing war 
between merchants and payment card networks over interchange fees.  
Some large merchants have filed suits against the payment card 
networks and issuing banks based on various legal theories. For 
example, Home Depot Inc. v. Visa Inc. centers around allegations that 
the payment networks and the issuing banks conspired through the 
EMV rollout to maintain signature verification: 
Visa and MasterCard have acted to keep a defective product in place—
signature-authenticated cards—in order to maintain their supracompetitive 
profits that are tethered to this faulty technology. Visa’s and MasterCard’s 
success in forcing merchants and consumers to accept and use 
technologically-inferior, and in fact defective, products—including 
products that Visa and MasterCard knew would increase fraud—is further 
evidence of their substantial market power.255  
A pair of cases have centered on the Durbin Amendment to 
Dodd–Frank and its implementing regulations, which were designed 
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to reduce interchange fees paid by merchants for debit transactions.256 
In addition to directly capping debit interchange rates, the Durbin 
Amendment prevent payment card networks or issuing banks from 
requiring network exclusivity or from otherwise “inhibit[ing] the 
ability of any person that accepts or honors debit cards for payments 
to direct the routing of electronic debit transactions for processing over 
any payment card network that may process such transactions.”257 
Specifically, the Durbin Amendment require that a merchant must 
have access to at least two independent networks for debit-card 
routing.258  
The grocery chain Kroger filed suit against Visa in the Southern 
District of Ohio alleging that the requirement that POS terminals allow 
non-PIN transactions for chip cards was “motivated by an intention to 
restrain competition” and, in addition to contract damages, asked for 
declaratory judgment that Visa’s contractual prohibition on Kroger 
requiring PIN verification for Visa debit cards violates the Durbin 
Amendment.259 The plaintiff’s theory is that by not requiring PIN 
verification with the EMV rollout, Visa is preventing Kroger from 
configuring its POS terminals to require PIN debit; hence in violation 
of the Durbin Amendment’s prohibitions on limiting merchants’ 
access to a non-Visa PIN network.260 For example, Kroger cites the 
following passage in the statement of basis and purpose for the 
regulations implementing the Durbin Amendment to support its claim: 
“[M]erchants may not be inhibited from encouraging the use of PIN 
debit by, for example, setting PIN debit as a default payment method 
or blocking the use of signature debit altogether.”261 Thus, Kroger 
argues that by not requiring PIN authorization, the networks and 
issuing banks are hindering the merchants’ legal entitlement to “block 
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the use of signature debit altogether,” even if consumers prefer to use 
this method.262  
Wal-Mart also brought suit against Visa in New York state court 
under an almost identical theory.263 In preparation for the EMV roll-
out, Wal-Mart began to install chip-reading terminals that required 
cardholders with chip-enabled debit cards to verify their transaction 
with a PIN.264 Visa views this action as a breach of its agreement with 
Wal-Mart, which requires merchants to continue to allow consumers 
to use signature authentication for Visa-branded debit cards.265 Wal-
Mart sued Visa, seeking declaratory judgment that Visa cannot 
enforce its contractual provisions in a manner that would prohibit Wal-
Mart’s adoption of the chip and PIN protocol.266 Like Kroger’s suit, 
Wal-Mart relies heavily on the Durbin Amendment’s provisions that 
allow merchants to steer consumers toward the network of their 
choice.267  
In addition to these private cases, state attorneys general have 
advocated in favor of a “chip and PIN” standard.268 In November 2015, 
nine Democratic state attorneys general sent a letter to the CEOs of 
eight major financial services companies “urg[ing]” them “expedite 
the implementation of chip and PIN technology in the United States” 
by acting collectively “to move to the full chip and PIN technology as 
soon as possible.”269 While noting that they are not suggesting that chip 
and PIN technology “should be enshrined in federal or state law as a 
legal mandate,” the Democratic attorneys general argued that adoption 
of full “chip and PIN” technology would be “an important security 
improvement” that would provide enhanced protections for consumers 
and ask for its voluntary adoption.270 
Why are some large merchants so adamant about their support 
and intensive lobbying efforts in favor of a PIN mandate, including 
launching several major class-action lawsuits? This intensive and 
expensive effort seems especially puzzling in light of the fact that 
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merchants that install EMV devices bear no risk of loss from lost or 
stolen fraud, the only source of fraud that PIN verification addresses. 
Further adding to the puzzle is that PIN transactions are slower than 
non-PIN transactions and much more likely to result in improperly 
denied or failed transactions. Not to mention the reality that PIN 
verification is rapidly being overtaken by faster, more effective 
technologies such as biometric identification and use of Big Data 
methods to verify transactions. 
One possible explanation for merchants’ support of PIN 
verification relates less to the risk of fraud or merchant fraud losses 
than to long-standing efforts by merchants to steer consumers toward 
increased use of PIN networks, which tend to charge lower 
interchange fees than signature networks. Those savings are passed 
through to merchants in lower merchant discount rates. Annual data 
collected by the Federal Reserve reveals this cost differential. Debit 
card interchange fees today are set on a two-tier system: (a) large 
banks (with more than $10 billion in assets) that are subject to the price 
controls imposed by the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd–Frank 
financial reform legislation, and (b) exempt banks (with less than $10 
billion in assets) that are not subject to the Durbin Amendment’s 
interchange price controls.271 According to the Federal Reserve, 
exempt banks provide about 38% of the total volume of signature debit 
card transactions in the U.S. annually and about 35% of the PIN debit 
transactions.272 For transactions made by cards issued by Durbin-
covered banks, the average interchange fees for signature and PIN 
debit transactions were virtually identical: $0.22 and $0.24, 
respectively.273 For exempt banks, however, the differences were 
dramatic: the average interchange fee for signature debit was 
approximately $0.52, compared with $0.25 for PIN debit.274 Thus, with 
respect to signature debit transactions made with cards from exempt 
banks (approximately 38% of all transactions), merchants could save 
substantial sums of money if consumers were compelled to use PIN 
debit instead.275 In addition, 93% of the transaction volume for prepaid 
cards (which constitute a rapidly growing segment of the market) is 
exempt from the Durbin Amendment’s interchange price controls.276 
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Thus, it appears that merchants’ primary goal in their litigation 
and lobbying efforts is to increase the overall use of PIN networks. 
Indeed, it makes economic sense for merchants to push for a 
requirement that would allow them to route a larger proportion of their 
electronic payments through cheaper networks.  
There also appears to be a division between small and large 
merchants with regard to the EMV rollout. For example, in a survey 
of merchants during June 2016, Aite Group found that 77% of very 
large merchants (with more than $50 million in revenue) favored 
implementation of Chip and PIN, but only 50% of smaller merchants 
(with $500,000 to $2.4 million in revenue) did so. 277  Although lower 
interchange fees for PIN debit versus signature debit explain why 
merchants as a whole would prefer the former, that does not explain 
the difference between large and small merchants’ support for PIN as 
part of the EMV rollout. One answer to this conundrum may be found 
in the way that interchange fees are structured, which causes larger 
merchants to benefit disproportionately when consumers use PIN 
versus signature verification for electronic transactions.278 For larger 
merchants, discount rates are typically set by cost-plus pricing, 
composed of the relevant interchange fee with certain costs added 
on.279 Smaller merchants, by contrast, typically have bundled pricing 
models, in which they are quoted an overall cost for a package of 
services, including debit and credit card payments.280 As a result, 
interchange fees are marginal costs for large merchants and tend to be 
passed through much more rapidly and completely for large merchants 
than for smaller merchants.281 
It is important to note that, even with the EMV rollout, 
consumers have a choice: If they prefer the additional security of 
entering their PIN, they frequently have that option.282 Nonetheless, as 
noted earlier, signature debit remains very popular with consumers in 
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the U.S.283 Several factors may explain this popularity. First, 
consumers are averse to the inconvenience of paying with debit (the 
time and friction of remembering and entering a PIN), and they are 
afraid that PIN-skimming could dramatically increase their losses if it 
ended up draining their bank accounts. Second, consumers are simply 
unable to use PIN debit for many transactions, such as online 
transactions and those in sit-down restaurants. Third, consumers may 
have a heightened sense of confidence in the Visa or MasterCard 
processing networks as compared with the myriad PIN-debit networks 
that many consumers do not recognize. In this manner, merchants 
pushing a PIN mandate are actually asking government to limit 
consumer choice by eliminating the popular option of signature debit. 
This observation suggests that the attempt to use the courts and state 
houses to require the adoption PIN may have little to do with reducing 
their fraud losses or protecting consumers but instead may aimed at 
increasing their bottom lines with lower interchange fees.  
CONCLUSION 
The evolution of payment card security has been driven by an 
economic logic of maximizing the value of the network for consumers, 
which is accomplished when network participants choose the mixture 
of POS and network-level security that minimizes transaction costs of 
using payment cards, while also adapting to a rapidly changing 
technological and threat environment.284 Consistent with experience, 
the joint-care model developed in this Article predicts that the EU 
would prefer to rely primarily on POS security because of higher 
telecommunication costs, whereas the U.S. would prefer to rely 
primarily on network authentication. The model predicts that an 
exogenous increase in the level of counterfeit fraud—largely a result 
of technological advances by fraudsters—would increase the use of 
POS security measures, a condition which is consistent with the timing 
of the adoption of the EMV standard by the U.S. Moreover, the use of 
a liability shift model as opposed to a mandate is likely to act as an 
efficient selection tool: Smaller merchants that are unlikely to be 
targets of counterfeit fraud can opt out if the risk of fraud is less than 
the cost of adopting EMV. 
The U.S. adoption of EMV was not full throated in that signature 
rather than PIN remains the means for consumer verification.285 This 
decision makes sense from the perspective of network value 
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maximization. There are strong reasons to believe that the marginal 
benefit from PIN verification—almost solely a reduction in lost or 
stolen fraud—is too meager to justify its adoption. Nonetheless, some 
large merchants have pushed for a PIN mandate. These proposals for 
government intervention with a PIN mandate now would likely disrupt 
the dynamic and evolving ecosystem of the evolution of payment 
cards and payment card security, imposing costs on consumers and 
merchants with very few benefits. In fact, there is some reason to 
believe that the recent push for command-and-control mandates on 
payment card security—particularly lobbying and litigation efforts in 
the U.S. by special interests to require chip and PIN technology—are 
driven by financial self-interest in lower interchange fees, not by 
consumer welfare. 
Before regulators intervene in a market, they must first 
determine that (a) there is a market failure, (b) an effective solution to 
that market failure can be identified, and (c) the benefits of any 
proposed solution exceed the costs of the intervention, including the 
unintended consequences. To date, it is difficult to see that there is a 
market failure in the consumer payment system. Instead, it appears 
that the system has evolved somewhat spontaneously over time in light 
of available technology and efforts to reduce payment friction while 
also protecting consumer security. It seems to make little sense to 
mandate a particular technology that will soon become obsolete rather 
than to allow the payment system to continue to evolve. 
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APPENDIX: JOINT-CARE MODEL AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
The payment care industry would like to avoid losses from fraudulent 
transactions, L, which can be reduced by action both at the point of 
sale, P, and through the network, N. These actions have marginal costs 
ϕ and θ, respectively. A consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for a 
payment card transaction is u, and his or her net value from using the 
payment card network is:  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥	𝑉,,-,P = 𝑞(𝑢 − 𝐿(𝑃,𝑁) − 𝜙𝑃 − 𝜃𝑁). (A1) 
 
Maximization implies that the following conditions will hold in 
equilibrium: 
 −𝐿, = 𝜙  (A2) −𝐿- = 𝜃  (A3) 𝑢 = 𝐿(𝑃,𝑁) + 𝜙𝑃 + 𝜃𝑁. (A4) 
 
These conditions simply indicate that each type of precaution will be 
used until its marginal benefit (–LP and –LN, which are avoided fraud 
losses from additional care) equals its marginal cost (𝜙, 𝜃). The third 
condition, equation A4, shows that network value is maximized when 
the marginal value to a consumer from a transaction, u, is equal to the 
marginal cost, which here is fraud and precaution costs. Clearly, by 
minimizing the right-hand side of this condition—the sum of fraud 
and fraud-avoidance costs—welfare is maximized. Because the 
optimal level of POS and network care is unrelated to output, we focus 
on the loss-minimization problem.  
Comparative Statics 
How a change in POS usage affects optimal network usage and vice 
versa can be found by differentiating the first-order conditions with 
respect to N: 
 𝐿,, ?,∗?- + 𝐿,- ?-∗?- = 0  (A5) 
 𝐿-, ?,∗?- + 𝐿-- ?-∗?- = 0.  (A6) 
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Solving yields: ?,∗?- = B456455 . Because LPP > 0, network and POS care 
are substitutes as long as LPN > 0, which implies that the marginal 
product of POS rises with increase in network care. 
 
The impact of an increase in price of network care on the use of both 
network and POS care can be found by differentiating the first-order 
conditions with respect to 𝜃: 
 𝐿,, 𝜕𝑃∗𝜕𝜃 + 𝐿,- 𝜕𝑁∗𝜕𝜃 = 0 
 𝐿-, ?,∗?8 + 𝐿-- ?-∗?8 + 1 = 0. 
 
Solving yields the following two expressions: 
 ?-∗?8 = B466STU < 0  (A7) 
 ?,∗?8 = 456STU > 0, (A8) 
 
where SOC is the determinant from the second-order condition matrix, 
assumed to be positive for minimum. Because of symmetry in the 
model, these results imply that ?,∗?∅ < 0, and ?-∗?∅ > 0. 
 
Finally, we examine the impact of an exogenous increase in losses 
associated with any level of care. To formalize this, consider a 
parameter δ > 0 that represents an exogenous shock to L(P,N): 
 𝐿(𝑃,𝑁)𝛿 + 𝜙𝑃 + 𝜃𝑁. (A9) 
 
First, we can see from the envelope theorem that total costs increase 
with α: 
 ?WU(,∗,-∗)?A = 𝐿(𝑃∗, 𝑁∗) > 0. (A10) 
 
Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to δ yields 
the following: 
 𝐿,, ?,∗?A + 𝐿,- ?-∗?A + 𝐿- = 0, 
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Solving yields the following: 
 
 (A11) 
.  (A12) 
 
The signs of A11 and A12 are ambiguous because the change in 
optimal POS and network care in response to a change in potential 
damages will depend on their relative substitutability. 
Simulation 
The simulation was based on the following baseline model: 
 𝑇𝐶(𝑃,𝑁) = (𝑃𝑁)BZ.[ + 𝑃 + 𝑁. (A13) 
 
In A1, 𝐿 = (𝑃𝑁)BZ.[, and ∅ = 𝜃 = 1.286 The solution to minimizing 
(A13) with respect to P and N yields the following values: 
• P* = 0.71 
• N* = 0.71 
• TC(P*,N*) = 2.82 
• L(P*,N*) = 1.40 
 
The solution is shown graphically in figure A1. 
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Figure A1: Graphical Solution to Joint Care Simulation 
 
To generate the data underlying figure 3, 𝜃 was varied from 0.25 to 
3.0, holding ∅ constant at 1.0. The results are listed in table A1. 
Table A1. Simulation Results 
 
